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In this paper we examine the sustainability of euro area public finances against the backdrop of 
population ageing. We critically assess the widely used projections of the Working Group on 
Ageing Populations (AWG) of the EU's Economic Policy Committee and argue that ageing costs 
may be higher than projected in the AWG reference scenario. Taking into account adjusted 
headline estimates for ageing costs, largely based upon the sensitivity analysis carried out by the 
AWG, we consider alternative indicators to quantify sustainability gaps for euro area countries. 
With respect to the policy implications, we assess the appropriateness of different budgetary 
strategies to restore fiscal sustainability taking into account intergenerational equity. Our stylised 
analysis based upon the lifetime contribution to the government's primary balance of different 
generations suggests that an important degree of pre-funding of the ageing costs is necessary to 
avoid shifting the burden of adjustment in a disproportionate way to future generations. For 
many euro area countries this implies that the medium-term targets defined in the context of the 
revised stability and growth pact would ideally need to be revised upwards to significant 
surpluses. 
 
JEL classification: H55, H60 
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Dans cet article, nous examinons la soutenabilité des finances publiques dans le contexte actuel 
du vieillisement démographique. Nous menons une analyse critique des travaux réalisés au sein 
du groupe de travail sur le vieillissement (AWG rattaché au Comité de Politique Economique de 
l’Union européenne) dont les projections sont largement utilisées par ailleurs. Nous montrons ainsi 
que le coût budgétaire du vieillisement pourraît être plus élevé que dans le scénario de référence 
d’AWG. Ensuite, en utilisant de nouvelles estimations du coût du vieillissement établies à partir 
de l’analyse de sensibilité produite par AWG, nous calculons des indicateurs de soutenabilité pour 
les pays de la zone euro. Au regard des implications de politique économique, nous évaluons la 
pertinence des différentes stratégies budgétaires pour restaurer la soutenabilité des finances 
publiques en prenant en compte l’équité intergénérationnelle. Dans une approche stylisée, fondée 
sur la contribution tout au long de la vie des individus au solde primaire public, nous montrons 
qu’il est nécessaire de préfinancer significativement le coût du veillissement pour éviter un report 
disproportionné de la charge de l’ajustement budgétaire aux générations futures. Cela impliquerait 
idéalement que les objectifs de moyen terme − définis dans le cadre du nouveau Pacte de Stabilité 
et de Croissance − soient révisés à la hausse. Pour de nombreux pays, l’objectif de moyen terme 
correspondrait alors à un excédent public substantiel.  
 
Codes JEL: H55, H60 
 
Mots clés  : vieillissement démographique, soutenabilité des finances publiques, comptabilité 
générationnelle, objectifs de moyen terme des politiques budgétaires   3
Non-technical summary 
 
Population ageing poses important challenges for policymakers in the coming decades. Increasing 
outlays for pension, health and elderly care systems will weigh on government budgets while 
economic growth is projected to decline due to the gradually decreasing population of working 
age. At the Stockholm European Council in 2001 a three-pronged strategy was formulated to deal 
with those challenges. It consists of structural reforms to pension and care systems, measures to 
increase employment and economic growth and fiscal consolidation. In this paper we focus on 
the latter element and we examine the issue of fiscal sustainability in euro area countries, i.e. the 
extent to which current fiscal policies can be continued or will have to be adjusted. 
We first carry out a critical assessment of the widely-used estimates of the budgetary impact of 
population ageing by the European Policy Committee's Working Group on Population Ageing. 
According to this Working Group's most recent estimates ageing would worsen budget balances 
by around 4.3% of GDP in the 2010-2050 period in the eleven countries that initially formed the 
euro area in 1999. However, such long-term projections are obviously surrounded with 
significant uncertainties. Using plausible alternative estimates for key parameters in the Working 
Group's projections, largely based upon sensitivity analyses carried out by this Working Group, 
we find that ageing costs in the 2010-2050 period may be 1 percentage point higher. 
Against this background, we look at a range of fiscal sustainability indicators and calculate 
sustainability gaps taking into account the modified ageing costs. We find that, of all the countries 
considered in this paper, public finances currently only appear to be sustainable in Finland. All 
other countries will have to adjust their fiscal policies sooner or later. The exact size of the 
sustainability gaps differs according to the indicator chosen but the ranking of the countries is 
more robust. The required adjustment effort is much smaller for countries that have recently 
implemented important structural reforms to their pension systems such as Germany, Austria 
and Italy.  
Sustainability indicators such as the ones considered in this paper typically measure the size of an 
'early' adjustment effort to restore fiscal sustainability. In many cases, this early adjustment effort 
would imply very important consolidation measures in the coming years. In this paper we 
propose to analyse the appropriateness of such a budgetary strategy on the basis of an 
intergenerational equity criterion. The method that is used to make this criterion operational is 
close to a classical generational accounting approach but differs from it in a number of specific 
aspects. By attributing government revenue and primary expenditure to different age cohorts, we 
calculate a 'net tax burden' for different generations. We then compare the evolution of this net 
tax burden for two different budgetary strategies, an early adjustment effort aimed at restoring 
fiscal sustainability in the coming years already and a more gradual fiscal adjustment spread over 
the 2010-2050 period. We show for three euro area countries - Belgium, Germany and France - 
that the earlier fiscal adjustment effort leads to a somewhat flatter profile for the net tax burden 
across age cohorts: the burden is higher for younger and future generations but the increase is 
generally less steep than under the more gradual adjustment effort. Hence, an earlier fiscal 
adjustment, i.e. 'pre-funding' (a large part of) the ageing costs via fiscal consolidation in the 
coming years can in our view be considered more equitable. 
Our calculations of the fiscal burden across age cohorts are partly based upon a number of 
simplifying assumptions (e.g. with respect to the age profiles for specific government revenue and 
expenditure items). However, sensitivity analysis shows that the main result - a pre-funding 
approach is more equitable than a gradual fiscal adjustment - is quite robust to changes in these 
assumptions.   4
While our paper does not provide any insights on which policy mix, e.g. structural reforms vs. 
budgetary pre-funding, is the optimal response to population ageing, its main conclusion seems 
relevant against the background of the developments in the EU fiscal rules. The ECOFIN 
Council has indeed recently indicated that long-term fiscal sustainability, notably the future 
impact of ageing, is to be better taken into account in the definition of the medium-term 
objectives  for fiscal policy introduced in the context of the revised stability and growth pact. In 
this connection, concerns for intergenerational equity could play a role and could be made 
operational along the lines suggested here. If our tentative conclusions were confirmed and if no 
further cost-cutting reforms to pension and care systems are implemented, an upward revision of 
the medium-term objectives to significant surpluses may then be warranted for many EU 
Member States.   5
Résumé non technique  
 
Le vieillissement démographique constituera un important défi pour les gouvernements ces 
prochaines décennies. Des dépenses croissantes des systèmes de retraite, de santé et de 
dépendance pèseront sur les budgets des gouvenements alors que la croissance économique 
pourraît ralentir en raison de la baisse graduelle de la population en âge de travailler. Au Conseil 
européen de Stockholm de 2001, une stratégie reposant sur trois piliers a été décidée pour relever 
ces défis. Elle consiste à la fois en des réformes structurelles du système de retraite et de santé, 
mais aussi en des mesures pour accroître l’emploi, la croissance économique et viser 
l’assainissement budgétaire. Dans cet aticle, nous nous concentrons sur ce dernier élément et 
nous examinons la question de la soutenabilité des pays de la zone euro. Nous cherchons donc à 
savoir, dans quelle mesure les politiques budgétaires actuelles peuvent être poursuivies ou doivent 
être ajustées.  
Nous procédons d’abord à une analyse critique des estimations de l’impact budgétaire du 
vieillissement de la population qui ont été réalisées par le groupe de travail sur le vieillissement 
(AWG rattaché au Comité de Politique Economique de l’Union européenne) et qui sont 
largement utilisées par ailleurs. Selon les dernières projections d’AWG, sur la période 2010-2050, le 
vieillissement pourrait conduire à une détérioration des soldes publics de 4.3% du PIB en 
moyenne dans les onze pays qui constituaient initiallement la zone euro en 1999. Toutefois, des 
projections à aussi long horizon sont entâchées de nombreuses incertitudes. Ainsi, en utilisant des 
évaluations alternatives mais plausibles pour les paramètres clés des projections, et en nous 
basant essentiellement sur l’analyse de la sensibilité réalisée par AWG, nous trouvons que le coût 
du vieillissement pourraît être plus élevé de 1 point de pourcentage sur la période 2010-2050.  
Dans ce cadre, nous nous penchons sur un large éventail d’indicateurs de soutenabilité et 
calculons des indicateurs d’écart de soutenabilité ou « sustainability gaps »  en prenant en compte 
nos nouvelles évaluations du coût du vieillissement. Parmi tous les pays étudiés dans cet article, 
seule la Finlande semble être dans une situation soutenable. Tous les autres pays devront, tôt ou 
tard, ajuster leurs politiques budgétaires. Si la taille exacte de l’écart de soutenabilité dépend de 
l’indicateur choisi, le rang de classement des pays est plus robuste d’un indicateur à l’autre. En 
particulier, l’ajustement requis est plus petit dans les pays qui ont récemment mis en œuvre des 
réformes structurelles importantes de leur système de retraite comme l’Allemagne, l’Autriche ou 
l’Italie. 
Les indicateurs de soutenabilité considérés dans cet article mesurent généralement la taille d’un 
ajustement budgétaire nécessaire à la restauration rapide de la soutenabilité des finances 
publiques. Dans beaucoup de cas, cet ajustement impliquerait des mesures de consolidation 
budgétaire assez drastiques pour ces prochaines années. Dans cet article, nous proposons 
d’analyser la pertinence de telles stratégies budgétaires sur la base d’un critère d’équité 
intergénérationnelle. La méthode utilisée pour rendre opérationnel ce critère est proche de la 
comptabilité générationnelle classique mais en diffère cependant par nombre d’aspects 
spécifiques. En attribuant aux différentes cohortes le bénéfice des dépenses publiques et la charge 
des prélèvements obligatoires, nous calculons une «  charge fiscale  nette» pour chacune des 
générations. Nous comparons ensuite l’évolution de cette charge fiscale nette pour deux 
stratégies budgétaires différentes, une stratégie d’ajustement budgétaire rapide visant à restaurer la 
soutenabilité budgétaire dans les prochaines années et une stratégie plus graduelle qui répartit les 
efforts d’ajustement budgétaire sur la période 2010-2050. Pour trois pays de la zone euro – 
Belgique, Allemagne et Italie – , nous montrons que l’ajustement budgétaire rapide conduit à une 
profil plus plat des charges fiscales nettes des différentes cohortes : la charge est plus forte pour 
les générations les plus jeunes ou à venir, mais l’augmentation est moins forte que dans le cas   6
d’un ajustement plus graduel. En ce sens, un ajustement budgétaire rapide, c’est-à-dire un 
préfinancement (substantiel) du coût budgétaire du vieillissement au moyen de la consolidation 
budgétaire peut être considéré comme plus équitable.  
Notre évaluation de la charge fiscale nette des différentes générations est fondée sur de 
nombreuses hypothèses simplificatrices (par exemple le profil par âge des postes budgétaires de 
dépenses ou de recettes). Toutefois, une analyse de sensibilité montre que le résultat principal, à 
savoir que l’approche du préfinancement est plus équitable que l’ajustement graduel, est assez 
robuste aux changements d’hypothèses.  
Notre article ne permet pas de conclure sur le policy mix optimal (réformes 
structurelles/réformes budgétaires) à mettre en œuvre pour faire face au vieillissement 
démographique. Toutefois, ses principales conclusions sont pertinentes dans le cadre actuel du 
développement des règles budgétaires dans l’Union européenne. En effet, le Conseil ECOFIN a 
décidé récemment que la soutenabilité à long terme des finances publiques, et plus 
particulièrement l’impact du vieillissement, devrait mieux être prise en compte dans la 
redéfinition des objectifs de moyen terme des politiques budgétaires consécutive à la réforme du 
Pacte de Stabilité et de Croissance. Dans cette optique, des considérations d’équité 
intergénérationnelle pourraient jouer un rôle et nous proposons ici une façon de les rendre 
opérationnelles. Si nos conclusions provisoires devaient être confirmées et si aucune réforme 
substantielle visant à diminuer les dépenses des systèmes de retraite et de santé n’était mise en 
œuvre, il serait nécessaire de réviser à la hausse les objectifs de moyen terme. Pour de nombreux 
pays, l’objectif de moyen terme correspondrait alors à un excédent budgétaire public assez élevé.  
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Introduction 
Populations are ageing rapidly in nearly all EU Member States, due to gradually increasing life 
expectancy, the baby-boom baby-bust cycle observed in the second half of the last century and a 
long-run trend towards low birth rates. Awareness of the potentially very important 
macroeconomic and budgetary implications of these demographic changes has increased in 
recent years. Authorities now routinely try to gauge the impact of population ageing on the 
sustainability of public finances and increasingly take into account the findings of these studies 
when defining their economic policies. In this connection, a three-pronged strategy was 
formulated at the Stockholm European Council in 2001. It entails a rapid reduction of public 
debt, an increase in employment and productivity and reforms to existing pension, health and 
long-term care systems. Policy responses should obviously comply with all relevant EU fiscal 
rules and be tailored to restore fiscal sustainability in a timely manner. 
With respect to the budgetary pillar of that three-pronged strategy and in accordance with the 
Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council of 9 October 2007, long-term fiscal sustainability, notably 
the future impact of ageing, is to be better taken into account in the definition of the medium-
term objectives (MTOs) for fiscal policy introduced in the context of the revised stability and 
growth pact. One of the key questions in this respect is to what extent future ageing-related 
expenditure should be pre-funded by attaining high primary surpluses in the coming years. 
This paper does not provide any insights on which policy mix, e.g. structural reforms vs. 
budgetary pre-funding, is the optimal response to population ageing. It simply wants to 
contribute to the debate on the appropriate timing of the budgetary component of the response 
to population ageing - and the definition of 'ageing-augmented' MTOs in particular - keeping all 
other things equal. We specifically analyse the relative merits of an 'early' fiscal adjustment 
(implying a strong fiscal tightening for many countries in the following years) and a more gradual 
fiscal adjustment. In this connection, we propose to use intergenerational equity as the main 
criterion and to look into the intergenerational implications of these two stylised strategies on the 
basis of the lifetime net contribution to the government's primary balance of different cohorts. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The first section assesses the EU-wide 
projections of the ageing costs used as a benchmark in the current institutional context. This is 
done on the basis of a detailed analysis for most euro area countries.1 On the basis of this 
assessment, we present alternative estimates of the ageing costs for each of the different 
countries considered. The second section is devoted to the quantification of the sustainability 
gaps (taking into account the alternative estimates of the ageing costs). The third section then 
looks at the intergenerational implications of different adjustment strategies to restore fiscal 
sustainability along the lines suggested above for a selected group of euro area countries 
(Belgium, Germany, and France). The final section presents some concluding remarks. 
 
 
1   Individual country fiches are in Annex.   8
                                                
1  Age-related expenditure projections by the Working Group on Ageing 
Populations: a risk- assessment exercise 
1.1  The projections of the Working Group on Ageing Populations: a bird’s eye view 
From the mid-80s, when it became apparent that Western countries were experiencing major 
changes in their demographic structure, an increasing number of studies have examined the long-
term prospects for public budgets. These studies usually focus on expenditure items which are 
particularly dependent on the age structure of populations (pensions, health, education). Some 
studies also develop projections for the primary balance and estimate the adjustment required to 
ensure budgetary sustainability (usually meaning a stable undiscounted debt to GDP ratio).   
International organisations have been at the forefront in the development of the literature.2 Their 
studies allowed cross-country comparison thanks to methodological homogeneity. However, 
since the reliability of age-related expenditure projections depends on detailed and updated 
institutional knowledge, the paucity of national projections represented a major drawback. 
Growing awareness of the impact of population ageing gradually led to a substantial increase in 
the resources devoted to national long-term expenditure projections. Yet, at the turn of the 
century, projections for the main age-related expenditure items were available only for a few 
industrial countries.  
Against this background, the age-related expenditure projections by the Working Group on 
Ageing Populations (AWG) for EU member states come with a unique value added. They are 
produced in a multilateral setting involving national authorities and an international organisation, 
thus reconciling as much as possible national detail and cross-country comparability.  
The 2006 AWG report covers 25 EU member states and for most of them provides projections 
for pensions, health care, long-term care, education, and unemployment benefits (EPC and EC, 
2006).3 The projections reflect the impact of enacted legislation, including provisions already 
legislated but coming only into force over time. The report is rich in sensitivity analysis.  
In the report, the main results under the reference scenario are summarised as follows4: “Overall, 
ageing populations” (are) “projected to lead to increases in public spending in most Member 
States by 2050 on the basis of current policies, although there is a wide degree of diversity across 
countries. The following points should be highlighted: 
•  for the EU15 and the Euro-area as a whole, public spending is projected to increase by about 
4 percentage points between 2004 and 2050; […] 
•  most of the projected increase in public spending will be on pensions, health care and long-
term care. Potential offsetting savings in terms of public spending on education and 
unemployment benefits are likely to be limited;  
•  the budgetary impact of ageing in most Member States starts to become apparent as of 2010. 
However, the largest increases in spending […] take place between 2020 and 2040” 
 
2   See Heller et al. (1986), Leibfritz et al. (1995), and Franco and Munzi (1997). 
3   Countries included are the EU15 (the 12 countries in the euro area at the time of the report – Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Portugal – plus Denmark, Sweden and 
the UK) and EU10 (the ten new member states which joined the union before the report was prepared: Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia). Not all expenditure items are 
projected for all countries. 
4   EC and EPC, 2006, p. 10. See also the table reproduced later in the main text. This paper focuses on the countries that were in the euro area at the time of the AWG report. 
The assumptions underlying the AWG baseline projections are analysed in detail in this section in 
order to assess whether the underlying risks are broadly balanced or not. To this end we mostly 
rely on sensitivity analyses accompanying AWG projections.  
The AWG projections encompass five public expenditure items which are likely to be affected by 
ageing: pensions, health care, long-term care, education and unemployment. Most of these items 
directly depend on the age structure of populations. Other expenditure items not considered by 
the AWG, such as family allowances, may also depend on demographics. Certain revenue 
categories may also be affected by population ageing: ageing-induced shifts in consumption 
patterns may have an impact on indirect taxes while taxes and social contributions levied on 
wages obviously depend on the age structure of the population.  
1.2  The AWG projections for ageing-related spending in the euro area: main results 
The AWG projections encompass the 2004-2050 period but we choose to focus on the 2010-
2050 period since the projected change between 2004 and 2010 has in some cases been outdated 
by new data and most of the expenditure increase occurs after 2010.5  


















Change in old-age 
dependency ratio (pp)
Increase in expenditure (pp of GDP)
 
Ageing-related spending rises by 4.3 p.p. of GDP on average in the euro area (excluding Greece6) 
over the 2010-2050 period in the baseline scenario of the AWG (Table 1.1). Increases range from 
1.1 p.p. (Austria) to 8.9 p.p. of GDP (Spain). For most countries, expenditure peaks around 2040. 
For all countries except Austria and Italy the bulk of the increase comes from pensions. For Italy, 
this reflects the introduction of a defined-contribution scheme in 1995. In Austria, it is the result 
of reforms enacted as of 2000 which increased the legal retirement age, linked contributions more 
                                                 
5   Early in 2007 a major social security reform was approved in Portugal. Updated projections, peer-reviewed at the AWG 
and approved at the EPC in October 2007, are used throughout this paper.  
6   Pension and long-term care expenditure data were not provided for Greece in the AWG projection exercise. 
  9  10
                                                
closely to benefits (with actuarial reductions for early pensions) and switched the indexation rule 
for pensions from wages to prices as of 2006.  
There is no clear correlation between projected expenditure increases and expected changes in 
old-age dependency ratios. Graph 1 shows that Italy and Austria, whose dependency ratios are 
expected to increase more than average, are the countries where expenditure is projected to grow 
least. At the same time, the countries where expenditure is projected to grow most (Luxembourg, 
Spain and Ireland) and by similar amounts (around 8 p.p. of GDP) are characterised by very 
different expected increases in dependency ratios (from 15 to 40 p.p.).  This reflects differences 
in pension systems rules or maturity and/or in health and long-term care policies. 
1.3  The AWG projections for ageing-related spending in the euro area: main assumptions 
1.3.1  Demographic assumptions 
The demographic scenario underlying the expenditure projections was prepared by Eurostat. It is 
based on, though not identical to, the EUROPOP2004 projection released by Eurostat in 2005.7 
The fertility rate assumptions are the same as those in the baseline of EUROPOP2004; the 
assumptions on life expectancy at birth are based on a scenario produced by Eurostat specifically 
for the AWG; the migration assumptions are the same as those in the baseline of 
EUROPOP2004 except for Germany, Italy and Spain, where adjustments were made to the level 
and/or age structure of migrants to incorporate more recent information.  
More specifically: 
•  fertility rates increase over the projection period in all countries except France and Ireland, 
where small declines are projected for the sake of convergence. Fertility rates remain well 
below the replacement rate stabilising population size (2.1). Nevertheless, except for France 
and Ireland, the downward past trends are assumed to be curbed;  
•  life expectancy at birth is projected to rise further, though at a slower pace than over the 
1960-2000 period, when it increased by about eight years in EU countries (three months per 
annum). 
In this scenario population in the euro area will not be much smaller in 2050, but it will be 
significantly older: population of working age will decline by 16 percent. This aggregate picture 
hides wide cross-country variation. The population is projected to fall sharply in Italy and 
Germany and to increase substantially in France, the Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium and 
Luxemburg. Changes in the age structure of population are less diverse. Population aged less than 
15 years and population of working age (from 15 to 64 years old) will decline in all countries 
except Ireland and Luxembourg (by 17% and 16% respectively, for the euro area). Population 
aged 65 or more will increase in all countries, with hikes ranging from 17% to 30%. 
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Macroeconomic assumptions 
The participation rate is projected to increase by about 6 p.p. over 2003-2050 in the euro area. As a result, 
the workforce declines less than population of working age (8% versus 16%). This mainly reflects the 
tendency for women belonging to recent cohorts to have participation levels higher than those of older 
cohorts. Moreover, the trend reduction in participation rates due to population ageing is assumed to be 
offset by the effects of pension reforms. 
Unemployment rates are assumed to rapidly converge to their structural level and stay constant thereafter. 
Unemployment in the euro area is projected to fall from 9.0% in 2003 to 7.6% in 2010 and 6.4% in 2050. 
As a result, the reduction in the number of employed people over 2003-2050 is lower than the reduction 
in the workforce (5% versus 8%). 
Labour productivity growth rises from 1.1% on average over the 2004-10 period, to 1¾% over the 2011-
50 period, thus limiting the slowdown in GDP growth due to falling employment.  
1.3.2   “Expenditure” assumptions 
Given legislation and past contributory careers, pensions are mostly determined by demographic and 
macroeconomic assumptions, but projections for health and long-term care also depend on other 
elements such as the evolution over time of: (1) age and gender-contingent demand and consumption of 
health and long-term care (as summarised in expenditure profiles by age category), and (2) the relative 
cost of services.  
The AWG reference scenario for health expenditure assumes that: (a) half of the projected increase in life 
expectancy is spent in good health8, (b) the income elasticity of health care spending is close to one, and 
(c) the relative cost of health services does not change over time. 
Long-term care projections assume that (a) age-specific disability rates fall by half of the projected 
decrease in age-specific mortality rates, (b) unit costs increase in line with GDP per worker, and (c) the 
probability of receiving formal care remains constant. The first assumption implies that about half of the 
projected gains in life expectancy up to 2050 would be spent in good health and free of disability. The 
second assumption acknowledges the labour-intensive nature of the sector and, hence, the likelihood of 
increasing relative costs (different from the reference scenario for health care). The third assumption 
implies that the share of elderly people receiving formal care remains constant. 
1.4  Risk assessment 
Long-term projection exercises are subject to many uncertainties. These stem from various elements such 
as macroeconomic or demographic assumptions and the policy implementation risks (e.g. as regards 
current legislation for pension systems including rules on indexation of pension benefits). We try to 
identify and assess these risks in the AWG projections and, where they are deemed likely to materialise 
and quantifiable, we factor them into the projections (see section 1.5).9 
1.4.1  Demographic and macroeconomic assumptions 
Changes in life expectancy and old-age dependency ratios may be underestimated. Projections underlying 
the AWG 2006 exercise were based on the 2000 census. For the countries considered here, a comparison 
 
8   This is an intermediate hypothesis between a “pure ageing” assumption (the age profile of per capita spending on health 
remains constant over time so that all gains in life expectancy are assumed to be spent in bad health) and a “constant 
health” assumption (all future gains in life expectancy are spent in good health). 
9   We focus the discussion below on the area as a whole. For an overview of the different countries, please refer to the 
country fiches in the aforementioned Annex.    14
                                                
with earlier projections based on the 1995 census shows that in the population projections used by the 
AWG: (a) life expectancy at birth in the base year of the projections is, on average, about one year higher 
for both men and women; (b) the projected increase in life expectancy at birth up to 2050 is almost one 
year higher for men; (c) the old-age dependency ratio is 1.5 p.p. higher both at the beginning and at the 
end of the projection.  
Available information suggests that the next update of demographic projections could result in revisions 
of a similar nature in several countries. Moreover, other demographic assumptions (such as those 
concerning increases in fertility rates) can be questioned. Longevity projections are surrounded by a 
significant degree of uncertainty. The degree of this uncertainty is difficult to measure. In the past, the 
numbers of the elderly (especially the oldest) were systematically under-predicted (Visco, 2006). Yet, this 
is the group on which much of age-related expenditure is concentrated. There are also significant lags in 
the production and adoption of mortality tables.  
With respect to the macroeconomic assumptions, the projected increase in the participation rate can be 
considered either as too optimistic or too fast in some countries. Indeed, the overall employment rate is 
assumed to reach the 70% Lisbon employment rate target in 2020. Yet, in some countries, improvements 
made until now do not seem to be in line with this assumption. Finally, concerning the assumed evolution 
of unemployment one should consider both the variability of NAIRU estimates and the ad-hoc nature of 
the assumptions regarding the convergence to the EU-15 average. 
1.4.2  “Expenditure” assumptions 
With respect to pension expenditure, risks primarily pertain to the development of entitlements. Specific 
risks may come from the rising share of the elderly in the voting population, in particular for countries 
where the replacement ratio is low and/or indexation of pension benefits is lower than nominal wage 
growth. 
Demography and health status are not the only determinants of the evolution of health-care expenditure. 
Medical practices may change due to technological improvements or to consumer preferences. Moreover, 
relative costs might increase as productivity growth in the health sector is lower than in the rest of the 
economy. In the AWG reference scenario, however, all factors different from the evolution of morbidity 
are taken account of by assuming an elasticity of expenditure to income that is 1.1 at the beginning of the 
period, gradually declining to 1 thereafter. While the AWG justifies this assumption with OECD data 
showing that the elasticity has declined in the nineties relative to the eighties (EC 2005), this is likely to be 
due to the enactment of cost-containment policies (price caps, wage moderation). These policies cannot 
be sustained forever (Dormont et al, 2007). Assuming a series of repeated cost-cutting reforms would be 
difficult to reconcile with a no-policy change scenario. The upside risks concerning income elasticity 
appear larger when considering that it is used as a catch-all term capturing also technological 
developments. Oliveira Martins and Maisonneuve (2006) show that the growth of health care expenditure 
per capita has been constantly 1 p.p. higher than that implied by ageing and forecast health status.  
Pressure for more public provision/financing of long-term care services could grow in the coming 
decades due to changes in family structure and women labour market participation. These trends may 
constrain the supply of informal care within households. For countries with less developed formal care 
systems today, the projected increase in public spending may underestimate the pressure.10   
 
10   This issue is more relevant for the 'southern' Euro-area countries such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain than for 
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1.5  Factoring the risks into the projections 
An in-depth risk assessment was carried out for individual euro area member states.11 On this basis the 
AWG reference scenario was modified in a mechanical way taking into account plausible alternative 
assumptions for key parameters and mostly using information from AWG sensitivity analyses with a view 
to addressing some of the concerns discussed above. 
For countries where more recent demographic projections are available indicating higher life expectancy 
than in the AWG reference scenario, we increase the expenditure projection by multiplying the difference 
between those more recent life expectancy estimates and the ones used by the AWG with the impact of 
an extra life year on spending as estimated by the AWG (an increase in life expectancy at birth of 
1-1.5 year by 2050 is estimated to increase both pension and health expenditure by 0.3 p.p. on average in 
the EU).12  
We also use a constant income elasticity of health expenditure as the benchmark assumption (1.1 
throughout the projection period). AWG estimates suggest that an increase of 0.1 in the income elasticity 
of health spending leads to an expenditure increase of 0.6 percent of GDP on average in the euro area.  
Finally, our headline scenario is based upon an increase in the provision of formal long-term care. We 
refer to an AWG simulation based on the assumption of an increase by 1% a year in the share of 
dependent elderly people receiving formal care, for the 2004-2020 period, with half the additional people 
receiving care in institutions and the other half at home: this entails an expenditure increase of 1.1 p.p. of 
GDP compared to the AWG reference scenario. 
1.6  Conclusions and limitations of our work 
This different set of assumptions leads to a projected increase in spending of 5.3 p.p. of GDP for the 
euro area (excluding Greece13), 1 p.p. more than in the AWG reference scenario (Table 1.3). Higher life 
expectancy only accounts for 0.3 p.p. of GDP; the effect is especially high for France, Germany and 
Austria. The increase in formal long-term care leads to 0.5 p.p. of GDP of extra spending, with peaks in 
Spain, the Netherlands, and Italy. Finally, constant income elasticity of health-care spending inflates 
projected expenditure by 0.2 p.p. of GDP.  
By confining ourselves to alternative AWG scenarios we may still underestimate risks. For instance, a 1.1 
income elasticity of health expenditure may still be low; the increase in long-term care may be stronger 
than what is implied by assuming that per capita spending grows in line with GDP per worker; the shift 
towards formal long-term care may be more marked than in the AWG scenario. 
In addition, we do not take into account policy implementation risks which are especially difficult to 
quantify as, by their very nature, they reflect entirely discretionary decisions. Such risks may be large. In 
some countries pensions are indexed to prices only; this will lead to a substantial decline in benefit ratios 
between the start and the end of the retirement period which may be unsustainable.14 There is also a risk 
that the falling purchasing power of pensions in relation to wage growth will exert pressures on other 
social security schemes. Pension reforms may thus generate additional costs in the form of income 
 
11   Please refer to the aforementioned Annex.  
12   Our use of recent demographic projections is incomplete. New projections do not necessarily revise life expectancy alone. 
For example, in the case of France, higher fertility rate would partly offset the impact of higher life expectancy on long 
term expenditure. We could not take this into account as there is no AWG alternative scenario for fertility rates. 
13   Including Greece (with alternative sources, documented in the aforementioned Annex) the increase in spending amounts 
to 5.5 p.p. 
14   Knell et al (2006) and the Study Group on Ageing (2007) discuss, respectively, the cases of Austria and of Belgium.   17
                                                
support and other benefits. Moreover, while projections are based on current legislation, the 
implementation of provisions to adjust pension spending to demography over time may be delayed.15  
Finally, we do not factor in macroeconomic risks. The AWG estimates that lower labour productivity 
growth by 0.25 p.p. over the projection horizon increases the level of pension spending by 0.4 p.p. of 
GDP on average in the EU. In the euro area changes are the highest in Portugal (1.3 p.p. of GDP) and in 
Austria and Spain (1.0 p.p.), while in Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands pensions are 
connected to earnings and no change is projected due to lower productivity. An employment rate which is 
1 p.p. higher than the baseline is projected to result in only small changes (in the 0.0-0.1 range for most 
countries), unless the increase is concentrated among older workers (an increase by 5 p.p. in the 
employment rate of older workers is projected to reduce spending by 0.2 p.p. of GDP on average in the 
euro area, with the highest impacts, 0.3-0.4 p.p., in France, Austria and Belgium). 
 
15   In Italy actuarial updates adjusting entitlements to life expectancy, legislated in 1995 and due in 2005, were postponed. 
Based on a recent agreement between the government and trade unions, the update is expected to take place in 2010.   18
                                                
2  Ageing and fiscal sustainability 
As indicated in the previous section, ageing will have a substantial impact on the budget balances of 
almost all euro area countries considered in the 2010-2050 period. In this section, the implications for the 
sustainability of public finances will be assessed. The first paragraph briefly reviews the theoretical notion 
of fiscal sustainability and assesses deficit-dynamics in the countries considered. The second paragraph 
then looks into the quantification of the sustainability gaps for these individual euro area countries. 
2.1  Fiscal sustainability and deficit-debt dynamics 
The notion of fiscal sustainability typically refers to the possibility of continuing current fiscal policy: 
sustainable policies are those that can be indefinitely continued while unsustainable policies will ultimately 
have to be modified. However, while the general intuition is clear, different specifications have been 
provided in the literature16, generally pertaining to restrictions on the evolution of public debt. 
From a theoretical point of view, notions of sustainability fall into two broad families (Spaventa, 1987). 
According to Domar (1944), the public debt ratio should converge to a finite value in order to avoid that 
the tax burden has to rise continuously. Other specifications in the same vein, such as those advocated by 
Buiter (1985) and Blanchard et al (1990), are more specific and require the debt ratio to converge back to 
its initial level. These definitions try to capture the idea, first advanced by Keynes (1923) that an ever-
increasing tax-rate is not sustainable in the long-run.  
According to a second, less restrictive notion of sustainability, fiscal policies are sustainable as long as the 
discounted value of all future primary surpluses equals the current level of public debt (see for example 
Blanchard et al, 1990). This is in turn true if and only if in the long run the rate of growth of the debt-to-
GDP ratio is lower than the interest rate17. Hence, the 'intertemporal budget constraint' expressed in 
ratios to GDP is more agnostic with respect to the path of public debt than the other definitions of 
sustainable policies.  
Despite the absence of a clear-cut theoretical benchmark, the 'conventional wisdom' definition of fiscal 
sustainability would imply that continuously rising and/or extremely high debt ratios are unsustainable. 
Against this background, it seems appropriate to first assess the impact of ageing on deficit-debt dynamics 
in the absence of any policy changes. 
To this end, budgetary outcomes for 2050 are calculated here taking into account the macroeconomic 
projections of the AWG's 2006 Report (European Commission, 2006) and assuming that from 2008 
onwards the primary balance is only affected by the ageing-related changes in government expenditure 
determined in section 1. The implicit interest rate on public debt was assumed to converge to 5.1% 
(which corresponds to a real rate of 3% and inflation of 2%, as assumed by the AWG) for all countries by 
2015. No deficit-debt adjustments were taken into account. A similar set of assumptions will be used 
throughout this section for the calculation of the different sustainability indicators. 
 
16   See Balassone and Franco (2000) for a detailed overview. 
17   An infinite number of sequences for the primary balance can in principle satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint and 
if the latter is expressed in ratios to GDP, some sequences may even imply a continuously increasing debt ratio.  
 Graph 2.1 - Fiscal outcomes in the absence of policy changes
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Budget balance in 2050
 
¹  Assuming that government revenue and non-ageing related primary expenditure (in structural terms) remain constant with respect to 
GDP at the 2007 level and that the implicit interest rate on public debt gradually converges to 5.1% by 2015. 
This exercise suggests that, taking into account the likely budgetary consequences of population ageing in 
the next decades, public finances are currently only sustainable in Finland. That country would still record 
a budget surplus of close to 2.5% of GDP in 2050 with a negative public debt ratio of some 60% of 
GDP18. Only in Finland deficit-debt dynamics would be favourable at the end of the period considered. 
All other countries considered would end up with substantial and increasing deficit and debt ratios in 
2050 (only in Austria, Germany and Spain public debt would be smaller than GDP in 2050). Hence, it 
seems clear that in all countries considered, except Finland, policies will ultimately have to be modified. 
                                                 
18   It should be stressed that, in actual practice, a gross consolidated debt ratio (Maastricht definition) can not fall below 
zero. Negative values for debt ratios used throughout this paper should be understood as a(n increase in the) net financial 
asset position. 
  192.2  Measurement of sustainability gaps 
As is clear from the wide range of deficit and debt ratios attained in 2050, the extent to which policies 
have to be changed in order to restore fiscal sustainability differs from country to country. Different 
approaches for the measurement of these 'sustainability gaps' exist. They typically attempt to quantify the 
fiscal effort required to reach a certain outcome at a pre-determined date in the future. 
In this connection, the tax-gap indicator proposed by Blanchard et al (1990) can be considered as one of 
the most general examples: it measures the required change in the tax ratio that, taking into account the 
projected development of primary expenditure and assumptions concerning the implicit interest rate on 
public debt and deficit-debt adjustments, would yield the same public debt ratio at the end of a given 
period as the one existing at the beginning of that period. In the context of the ageing problem, the 
period considered could be the one covered by the projections of ageing-related expenditure pressures 
(until 2050 in the case of the AWG) and the indicator would then measure the adjustment needed to 
avoid an increase in the debt ratio due to ageing.  
2.2.1  Sustainability indicators used by the European Commission 
The European Commission typically uses two quantitative indicators in its assessment of the sustainability 
of public finances in EU Member States (e.g. European Commission, 2007). The so-called S1 indicator is 
inspired by both the tax-gap indicator proposed by Blanchard et al. and the reference value for public 
debt defined in the Treaty on the European Community: it is defined as the size of the 'permanent 
budgetary adjustment necessary for the gross consolidated debt to reach 60% of GDP in 2050'. It is more 
specifically defined as the difference between the primary balance required in a certain target year to bring 
the debt ratio to 60% in 2050 - assuming that, after the target year, the primary balance is only affected by 
the ageing-related expenditure increases - and the one actually projected for that target year. It should be 
stressed that this S1 indicator is time-dependent: The S1 indicators published by the European Commission 
are typically linked to a target year in the medium term (e.g. at the end of the time horizon of the stability 
programmes) but, in principle, S1 can also be calculated using t+1 as the target year. Apart from the 
estimates of these ageing costs, the calculation of S1 also depends on a number of assumptions pertaining 
to activity growth, the implicit-interest rate on public debt and deficit-debt adjustments. 
Graph 2.2 - Sustainability indicators: S12015 
(percentages of GDP) 







S1 Required primary balance in 2015
 
  20The S1 indicator was re-calculated using 2015 as the target year and taking into account the ageing costs 
derived in section 1 and using similar assumptions (e.g. on activity growth, the implicit interest rate on 
public debt, deficit-debt adjustments) as above. For the debt ratio, the gross consolidated debt according 
to the Maastricht definition was used19. The results show that Austria, Germany and, especially, Finland 
would overshoot the primary balance required by 2015 to reach a 60% debt ratio in 2050 without any 
policy changes, as witnessed by the negative values for the S1 indicator. All other countries considered 
need to tighten fiscal policy in order to prevent the debt ratio from exceeding 60% in 2050 with the 
required improvements in the primary balance ranging from 0.2% of GDP for Spain to 9.4% of GDP for 
Greece20. These estimates are more pessimistic than those by the European Commission (4/2006), that 
considers public finances of IE, NL and FI as sustainable according to S1. As pointed out in Langenus 
(2006) the S1 indicator can be criticised as closing the indicated sustainability gap, i.e. bringing the primary 
balance to the level suggested by the indicator, only leads to a certain debt ratio by 2050 but does not 
restrict debt dynamics after that date in any way. For all of the countries considered here, debt dynamics 
would actually be unfavourable if they implement the fiscal adjustment suggested by the S1 indicator: 
keeping the primary balance constant after 2050 would imply a (rapidly) increasing debt ratio from the 
level of 60% in 2050, which seems at odds with the 'common wisdom' definition of fiscal sustainability. In 
addition, this clearly violates the Maastricht convergence criterion requiring that debt ratios above 60% 
have to be reduced at a satisfactory pace. 
The second sustainability indicator that is routinely used by the European Commission, the so-called S2 
indicator, is more directly linked to the aforementioned theoretical definition of sustainability proposed by 
Blanchard et al (1990): it measures the size of the 'permanent budgetary adjustment necessary to fulfil the 
intertemporal budget constraint' (European Commission, 2007). It should be stressed that, in principle, an 
infinite number of sequences for the primary balance can satisfy this constraint. Hence, the indicator 
needs to be defined more clearly to be operational.  
As for S1, the S2 indicator used by the European Commission is time-dependent. The required 
'permanent budgetary adjustment' is calibrated as the difference between the primary balance required in a 
certain target year to equate the present value of the sequence of all future primary balances in 
percentages of GDP (and assuming that, after the target year, the primary balance is only affected by the 
ageing-related spending increases) to the debt ratio projected at the beginning of the target year and the 
primary balance actually projected for that target year. Under the assumption that growth and interest 
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19   For some countries, the European Commission subtracts assets in pension funds from the debt position and therefore 
uses a modified (net) debt concept (see European Commission, 2005). In theory, i.e. with perfect capital markets, 
including financial assets as a stock variable in the intertemporal budget constraint leads to the same result as including 
the return on these assets as a flow variable since, from a present-value perspective, future interest or dividend payments 
would be equal to the current value of assets. Including both, the stock and the flow variable, however, would imply that 
the assets are counted twice. As the primary balance includes returns on financial assets, our calculations are based on 
gross debt figures (i.e. without deducting public pension fund assets).  
  In addition, we – like the EC (2007) – assume that returns on property income stay constant in relation to GDP which 
requires a growing asset position. While this might not be fully consistent with the assumption of zero deficit-debt 
adjustments, the resulting error should be small for most countries. Only for countries with large financial asset positions 
(the Netherlands and Finland) the sustainability indicators might more substantially underestimate the true size of the 
problem (see European Commission, 2006). 
20   As the AWG report (EPC and EC, 2006) does not provide any projections for pension expenditure alternative sources 
were used, most notably the pension projections in the updates of the Greek stability programme. For further details 
please see the Greek country fiche in the aforementioned Annex. 
  21with:  pbi = (projected) primary balance for year i (in percentages of GDP) 
 d i = (projected) public debt for year i (in percentages of GDP) 
  r = interest rate 
  g = GDP growth rate 
  ty = chosen target year 
It should be stressed that, as S2 (nor S1) is not discounted back to the current year, the exact value of this 
indicator depends on the chosen target year and will be higher, the further this target year lies in the 
future.  
By choosing the appropriate discount factor - ( ) ) 1 /( 1 r g + + in the formula above with, more specifically, 
r being set equal to the implicit interest rate on public debt - the definition of S2 is clearly linked to the 
law of motion of the public debt ratio. Since the primary balance is assumed to be affected by the ageing 
costs only and, hence, stays constant after the last year covered by projections of ageing costs, compliance 
with the intertemporal budget constraint then implies a constant public debt ratio after that year, as 
shown in Box 1. As the AWG projections currently cover the years up to 2050, S2 is actually equal to the 
fiscal effort needed in a given target year to reach a debt-stabilising budget balance in 2050. The 
corresponding debt ratio reached in 2050 (and maintained thereafter) differs from country to country and 
depends on the implicit interest rate (which, however, is the same for all countries concerned according to 
the assumptions used here) and economic growth after 2050 and the primary balance reached in 2050 (see 
box 1). The latter depends in turn on the initial conditions and the ageing costs. 
 
Box 1 - The intertemporal budget constraint, the S2 indicator and debt dynamics 
The European Commission uses the S2 indicator to operationalise the theoretical benchmark of the 
intertemporal budget constraint. The purpose of this box is to show that in the particular circumstances 
studied in this paper (and also assumed by the European Commission to calculate S2) with the activity 
growth, the implicit interest rate on public debt and the primary balance being assumed constant after a 
certain date (2050), the S2 indicator is equivalent to imposing a constant public debt ratio from that date 
onwards. 
The intertemporal budget constraint generally implies: 
i
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with: di = debt ratio in year i 
 pbi = the ratio of the primary balance to GDP in year i 
  g = nominal GDP growth (assumed constant, for simplicity) 
  r = the implicit interest rate on public debt (assumed constant, for simplicity) 
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              (6), which means that:  d d d T j t j = = 〉 ∀ :             (7) 
Hence, the S2 indicator is equivalent to imposing a constant debt ratio in the post-2050 period. 
The S2 indicator is also re-calculated here using 2015 as the target year and taking into account the same 
assumptions as for S1. According to this indicator, public finances are currently only sustainable in 
Finland. For all other countries the value for S2 is positive, ranging from 0.7% of GDP in Austria to close 
to 13% of GDP for Greece. Similarly, the European Commission (4/2006) only considers public finances 
sustainable in Finland according to the S2 indicator; however it indicates a much smaller adjustment effort 
for the remaining countries. The constant debt ratios reached as of 2050, if the fiscal adjustment 
suggested by the S2 indicator was implemented, also vary greatly, from more than 50% of GDP in Italy to 
large negative debt ratios in Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg and Greece. Differences in the stable end-of-
period debt ratio are mainly related to the primary balance reached at the end of the period by the 
different countries. In the Italian case, for instance, the primary balance is still positive, which implies a 
positive debt ratio in 2050 (as the implicit interest rate on public debt exceeds nominal GDP growth for 
all countries). This is also the case for other countries with relatively low ageing costs such as Austria and 
France. For countries with much higher ageing-related expenditure increases, such as Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Spain and Greece, the adjustment effort implied by S2 would lead to a primary deficit - and, 
hence, a negative debt ratio - in 2050. 
  23Graph 2.3 - Sustainability indicators: S22015 
(percentages of GDP) 




























¹ This is the constant debt ratio that would apply from 2050 onwards if the sustainability gap was closed by increasing the primary balance expected 
  for the target year (2015) by S2.
p.m. public debt ratio from 2050 onwards¹
S2 Required primary balance in 2015
 
2.2.2   Alternative sustainability indicators 
Two alternative sustainability indicators are proposed in Langenus (2006). The first one, S3, is a variant of 
the S2 indicator used by the European Commission. Rather than defining the budgetary adjustment 
required to reach a debt-stabilising budget balance in 2050 (or, more generally, at the end of the period 
considered) as an 'abrupt' increase in the target year, the required adjustment is calibrated as a gradual 
improvement of the primary balance in the years leading up to the target year. As the fiscal adjustment 
starts earlier, S3 is typically somewhat lower than S2, all other things equal.  
The second alternative indicator, S4 (originally used by Delbecque and Bogaert (1994)) measures the 
required gradual adjustment in the primary balance in the period up to the target year in order to reach a 
balanced budget by 2050. Like S1, this indicator does in principle not restrict debt dynamics and may 
correspond to a rising public debt ratio after the period considered. However, since the restriction 
imposed by S4 (a balanced budget in 2050) is stronger than the one associated with S1 (a debt ratio of 
60% in 2050), the public finance position at the end of the period considered implied by S4 is typically 
much sounder than the one implied by S1. 
  24  25
 
 
Table 2.1 - Sustainability indicators: S3 2015 and S4 2015 
(percentages of GDP) 
 














        
Finland  -0.4 4.1  -38.5  -0.7 3.7  -19.2 
Austria  0.7 2.6  10.6  0.7 2.7 5.7 
Germany  1.2 4.5  -18.8  1.1 4.4  -10.0 
Italy  1.4 4.3  48.7  1.8 4.7  25.1 
Spain  3.5 7.1  -139.8  2.4 6.0  -75.9 
Belgium  3.1 6.3  -20.1  2.9 6.1 -9.7 
Netherlands  4.1 4.8  -26.7  3.8 4.5  -12.2 
Ireland  5.5 5.6  -130.5  4.1 4.3  -64.4 
Portugal  4.4 4.4  -45.5  4.1 4.0  -24.6 
France  4.4 3.9 7.4 4.4 4.0 3.5 
Luxembourg  7.8 7.9  -130.4  5.6 5.7  -43.2 
Greece 12.0  10.8  -151.5  10.8  9.6  -80.2 
        
1  Figures in bold italics indicate a rising debt ratio in the post-2050 period if the 2050 primary balance is kept constant as a percentage of GDP. 
Both of the alternative sustainability indicators were calculated taking into account the same assumptions 
as for S1 and S2. The results for S3 are very much in line with those for S2: public finances currently only 
seem to be sustainable in Finland. All other countries will need to adjust their fiscal policy. Sustainability 
gaps are much smaller in Austria, Germany and Italy than in Ireland, Portugal, France, Luxembourg and, 
especially, Greece. As for S2, substantial negative public debt ratios are associated with the fiscal 
adjustment effort implied by S3 in many of the countries considered. 
The results for the S4 indicator are quite similar. The ranking of countries on the basis of sustainability 
concerns is only marginally different: Finland is again the only country where public finances appear to be 
sustainable while the biggest sustainability gaps are found for the Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal, France, 
Luxembourg and, especially, Greece. Debt ratios in 2050 associated with the adjustment effort implied by 
S4 range from 25% in Italy to large negative values in Greece, Spain and Ireland. For some countries, 
deficit-debt dynamics at the end of the period considered are unfavourable with the debt ratios set to 
worsen as of 2050 if the primary balance is kept constant. However, in the sample this is only the case for 
countries that post negative debt ratios in 2050. 
All in all, the analysis carried out in this section clearly shows that population ageing jeopardises fiscal 
sustainability in all the euro area countries considered except Finland. The actual measurement of 
sustainability gaps differs depending on the indicators used and, more specifically, their definition of the 
adjustment effort required to restore sustainability. However, the lowest sustainability gaps are typically 
found for Austria, Germany and Italy - countries that have undertaken more important pension reforms 
in the recent past - while the problems appear to be more severe in the Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal, 
France, Luxembourg and, in particular, Greece. 
The sustainability indicators used here are based upon a concrete specification of the adjustment effort 
needed to close the sustainability gap. By their construction, they are typically of the 'pre-funding' type, i.e. 
they measure the size of an 'early' adjustment effort, as the chosen target year usually does not lie very far 
in the future. However, this should by no means be interpreted as a policy recommendation: the   26
indicators only measure the size of the problem taking the medium term as the relevant benchmark, they 
do not imply anything about the appropriateness of such a relatively early adjustment effort to restore 
fiscal sustainability. The issue of which policy response is more appropriate - e.g. the 'early' fiscal 
adjustment measured by the sustainability indicators or a more gradual restoration of fiscal sustainability 
over the whole 2008-2050 period - can only be addressed on the basis of clearly defined criteria and this is 
done in the next section.    27
                                                
3  Intergenerational distribution effects of alternative adjustment strategies 
3.1  Introduction 
So far we have looked at the implications of demographic ageing on the public expenditure of twelve euro 
area countries on the basis of AWG projections. We have adjusted these estimates where it was deemed 
appropriate and derived new headline figures for the expected increase in the ratio of ageing-related 
expenditure to GDP (section 1). On the basis of these new headline estimates sustainability gaps for the 
twelve countries considered were calculated and it was shown that current policies are not sustainable for 
most countries (section 2).  
In this section, the relative merits of different budgetary strategies to ensure fiscal sustainability are 
investigated. This question has received considerable attention from EU political bodies for a long time. 
In a report to the March 2001 European Council of Stockholm, the Commission and the Ecofin Council 
agreed on a three-pronged strategy for addressing the budgetary consequences of demographic ageing: i) 
achieving or maintaining budget balances that reduce public debt at a fast pace and thereby lower interest 
payments and allow for a (partial) pre-funding of ageing-related costs; ii) raising employment rates 
especially amongst older workers and women, and iii) reforming social transfer systems (possibly 
including funding of public pensions). More recently, the debate has gained momentum. In the context of 
the 2005 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact, the Council called for implicit liabilities to be taken into 
account in the determination of medium-term budgetary objectives (MTOs) for EU member states. In the 
debate on how to implement this request, one of the main questions is to what extent future ageing-
related expenditure should be pre-funded by attaining high primary surpluses in the following years. 
In principle, many different combinations and characteristics of the three-pronged strategy defined in 
2001 are conceivable. Here, the focus is exclusively on the budgetary component, i.e. different choices 
concerning the adjustments to the (primary) budget balance. However, the methodology suggested here 
can in principle be extended to also include specific reforms aimed at increasing participation rates or 
reducing ageing-related expenditure. In any case, the impact of past reforms and a gradual increase in 
participation rates are already included in the adjusted AWG projections which form the basis of this 
section.  
A range of criteria can be applied when assessing the appropriateness of different budgetary strategies. 
For example, the impact on economic growth could be considered. An early adjustment might require a 
pronounced fiscal tightening over the following years, which could prove to be disruptive to the economy 
in the short run, even tough it might lead to higher GDP in the long run.21 In this paper, we only look at 
the criterion of intergenerational distribution.  
Budgetary strategies can differ with respect to a number of dimensions. We show results that compare 
strategies affecting different sets of budgetary categories: The case of a lump sum tax is simulated by 
distributing the adjustment burden equally on persons of all ages while an increase e.g. in social security 
contributions is modelled by burdening the working age population only. However, the main focus is on 
strategies that differ with respect to the timing of the adjustment effort. Therefore, an ‘early adjustment’ 
scenario, closing the sustainability gap by 2015, along the lines suggested by the S4 indicator, is compared 
to a ‘gradual adjustment’ scenario, in which consolidation is stretched out over the period 2008-2050.  
To make sure that the conclusions of the analysis are robust with respect to countries’ initial conditions 
and ageing prospects, a sufficiently diverse group of euro area member states is selected: i) Germany with 
a low sustainability gap due to a relatively favourable initial budget balance and a slightly below average 
increase in ageing-related expenditure, ii) Belgium which has a medium-sized sustainability gap, despite a 
 
21   See e.g. Hauner, Leigh and Skaarup (2007).   28
                                                
relatively favourable initial budget balance, due to a sharp projected increase in ageing-related expenditure, 
and iii) France which has a comparatively large sustainability gap, despite a below average expected 
increase in ageing-related expenditure, due to an unfavourable initial budgetary position. 22 
3.2  Methodology and data 
In the literature, issues of intergenerational distribution are usually analysed within the framework of 
generational accounting.23 Like most sustainability indicators, generational accounting takes into account 
the intertemporal budget constraint. However, it adds an intergenerational perspective to the analysis. 
This is achieved by calculating the present value of total net tax payments to the government over the 
(remaining) lifetime of a cohort born in a specific year, where net tax payments are defined as taxes paid 
minus transfers received.24 This present value of net tax payments is labelled generational account. The 
intergenerational distribution of the net tax burden is analysed by comparing the generational accounts of 
different cohorts.25 
Usually, the generational account of a newborn in the base year is compared to that of future generations 
(those born after the base year). According to the customary, albeit arbitrary, convention in generational 
accounting, all generations already living in the base year are exempted from the policy change necessary 
to satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint while any required adjustment effort is spread evenly over 
all future generations. Therefore, generational accounts in general indicate a higher burden for future 
generations if a sustainability gap exists.  
In this section, we in principle follow the generational accounting approach. However, the conventional 
generational accounting methodology has several drawbacks with regard to our objective and we tried to 
accommodate this by introducing some modifications. Firstly, most generational accounting studies for 
Europe forecast pension expenditure on the basis of their own models. These models are necessarily less 
elaborate than the sometimes very sophisticated pension models and databases that are used in 
projections by national institutions. Since future pension expenditure is determined not only by cohort 
effects but also by numerous legislative changes the full impact of which is sometimes only felt after 
several decades, it is preferable to revert to pension forecasts made with large models and a 
comprehensive database. This might be less obvious for other revenue and expenditure categories which 
are less influenced by effects that fully mature only after a long time. By basing our calculations on the 
(adjusted) AWG projections, we benefited from the detailed national forecasts that enter these 
projections.26 This approach also ensures consistency – except for the adjustments made in section 1 - 
with the AWG projections which underlie the sustainability analysis at the European level. However, this 
procedure also implies that all revenue and expenditure categories not deemed to be age-specific by the 
AWG are distributed evenly over all cohorts – an assumption that is clearly not in line with empirical 
 
22   This assessment is based on the results for the S4 indicator shown in table 2.1. The European Commission (2008) judges 
the three considered countries to be at “medium risk” with Germany being a borderline case to low risk. 
23   A different approach has been suggested by Langenus and Eugène (2005) and applied by Langenus (2006). They compare 
the implications of different budgetary strategies on the evolution of an average working-age person’s financial 
contribution to the government’s primary balance over time. They regard a situation in which successive generations of 
workers contribute roughly the same amount, corrected for nominal wage growth, as “intergenerationally fair”. The main 
difference between this and the generational accounting approach is that they take a cross-section instead of a 
longitudinal perspective, as they focus on net tax payments for individual years rather than over the total lifetime of a 
cohort.  
24   In some studies, not only transfers but also other government expenditure such as spending on general administration, 
domestic and external security, and investment are allocated (evenly) to different cohorts. 
25   Of course, only generational accounts at birth are comparable as the generational account of e.g. a 30-year old person fails 
to reflect the net tax payments already borne over the first three decades of his/her life. For a more detailed description 
of the generational accounting approach see, for example, Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1994), Raffelhüschen (1999) 
or Bonin (2001). 
26   A drawback of this procedure is that these models are often not fully disclosed to the public and therefore are largely a 
‘black box’ to outsiders. The AWG tries to overcome this problem by a peer review process.   29
                                                
facts. However, with a more extensive database, this exercise could be extended to a fully-fledged 
generational accounting procedure with age-specific expenditure profiles for a wide range of additional 
budgetary categories.  
A second drawback of the standard generational accounting approach is that the focus is on two cohorts 
only – newborns and those born one year later (representing future generations). As shown, for example, 
by Bonin (2001), with increasing life expectancy and policy measures that become effective only in the 
future, generational accounts of future generations cannot just be represented by the cohort born 
immediately after the base year: the generational account changes for every future generation. Moreover, 
considering the full lifetime generational accounts only of cohorts born in the base year (2007 in our 
study) or later implies that the intergenerational redistribution between all currently living cohorts can not 
be analysed correctly. We therefore explicitly calculate total lifetime generational accounts for the cohorts 
born between 1970 and 2050.27 To our knowledge, this has rarely been done before.28 
We then compare lifetime generational accounts under different budgetary strategies. Instead of explicitly 
targeting an ‘optimal’ strategy that minimises intergenerational redistribution, we compare two strategies 
that differ in the timing of the adjustment. In the first strategy, named early adjustment approach, the 
primary balance is increased in equal yearly steps until 2015 to ensure a balanced budget in 2050. In the 
second strategy, named gradual approach, the fiscal adjustment is spread out over the whole 2008-2050 
period. This gradual adjustment is calibrated to generate the same public debt ratio in 2150 as the early 
adjustment strategy with a view to making both strategies comparable when analysing their 
intergenerational implications. 
The restriction of an identical public debt ratio in 2150 may not be fully satisfactory when comparing the 
lifetime burden for two alternative budgetary strategies of generations born until 2050 only as the public 
debt ratio in 2150 is obviously also affected by (part of) the lifetime burden of generations born in the 
2051-2150 period. Theoretically, a comparison of alternative budgetary strategies on the basis of 
intergenerational equity may then be biased by neglecting the generations born after 2050. However, 
alternative restrictions to make the budgetary strategies considered comparable - e.g. an identical debt 
ratio in 2050 - were deemed to be less appropriate.  
Once the calculations are done, we need a criterion to decide which strategy has the more equitable 
distributional consequences. In the literature, several alternatives are proposed. Among the most 
prominent are the utilitarian social welfare function, that under restrictive assumptions implies 
redistribution until complete equality is achieved, and the maximin criterion proposed by Rawls, which 
maximises the utility of the person with the minimum utility.29 However, the assumptions under which 
these results are derived are highly questionable and it is unclear how this should be applied in an 
intertemporal setting. In this regard, taking a constant net tax burden across different generations as a 
benchmark is an appealing solution. It is an economical solution in terms of computational effort, it is 
easily understood and has the property to give equal weight to present and future generations even though 
the latter do not take part in current political decision-making process. It needs to be pointed out, 
however, that the intergenerational distribution of the burden imposed by government budgetary activity 
is ultimately a normative question that does not have clear-cut answers.30 An efficiency argument may 
 
27   While more generations are alive in the period 1970 to 2150 in which we analyse public finance developments, only for 
cohorts born between 1970 and 2050 their whole lifespan is covered. 
28   One example is Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlifkoff (1995). 
29   See e.g. Rosen (1999) and Rawls (1971). 
30   In fact, similar to progressive income taxation, an intertemporally rising net tax rate has sometimes been proposed in the 
literature in order to redistribute from (richer) future to (poorer) currently living generations. also be made for an even distribution of lifetime net tax payments, as Barro (1979) has shown that an 
unchanged tax ratio minimises the deadweight loss of taxation.31  
Therefore, in this paper an adjustment strategy will be deemed preferable if it leads to a flatter time profile 
for the total net tax burden across cohorts born in different years. This assumes that a relatively constant 
net lifetime contribution to the government's primary balance (deflated by nominal per capita GDP) 
across generations can be deemed equitable. This is methodologically close to imposing a constant 
lifetime net tax rate for all generations – a concept named generational balance in the generational 
accounting literature. Alternative definitions could pertain to keeping either the absolute (discounted) 
amount of the lifetime contribution constant across generations or the difference between market income 
and this amount constant across generations. These definitions would be consistent with a net tax rate 
that is, respectively, constantly decreasing or increasing over time.  
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In this equation, D represents the highest age considered,   the age-specific per capita amounts of 
individual revenue and primary expenditure categories z for a person of age a in year s and Ss,k the 
likelihood of a person born in k to survive until period s, while r denotes the discount rate.  
s z a h , ,
The age-profiles h for the individual ageing-related expenditure categories (pension, health, long-term 
care, unemployment and education) are taken from various sources.32 However, the delineation of these 
sources often does not exactly match those in the national accounts. It is therefore clear that the payment 
profiles obtained in this way and extrapolated to cover the population as a whole deviate from the 
aggregate figures shown in the national accounts. For this reason we adopt a two-stage approach, as is 
customary in the literature. In the first stage, the age-specific payment profiles are derived from the 
various data sources. In the second stage, the age-specific per capita amounts are multiplied by a scaling 
factor which is uniform for all age groups. This scaling factor is defined so as to ensure that in the 
aggregate - taking into account the size of the age classes - the respective national account figure is 
reached. In other words, while in the first stage only the relative positions of persons of different ages are 
determined, in the second stage the absolute payment profiles are calculated.  
This two-stage approach not only ensures consistency between absolute age-specific payment profiles and 
the national accounts data but also allows us to circumvent the limitation that we usually have relative 
payment profiles only for one point in time. Since the relative payment profiles typically change little over 
time, it is possible to use relative payment profiles which were obtained before (or after) the year under 
consideration, without this involving a major error.33 By contrast, the national accounts data needed for 
calculating the absolute payment profiles (which are subject to stronger fluctuations) are available for all 
years in the period from 1970 to 2050.  
The national accounts figures for the years from 1970 to 2007 for the five age-related expenditure items, 
the (primary) balance and GDP are available from national statistical institutes. However, the delineation 
often differs from that used by the AWG. Therefore a scaling factor was used in order to align national 
                                                 
31   However, Barro’s proposition only holds under certain assumptions and moreover relates to the (marginal) tax rate while 
here we refer to net taxes (taxes minus transfers). 
32   As pointed out above, all other budget categories are distributed evenly over all age classes. 
33    While most policy measures leave the relative age-specific payments profiles unaffected, these profiles change, for 
example in the case of a legislated increase in the retirement age.  
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accounts figures to the AWG definition.34 For the period 2008 to 2050 we used the adjusted AWG 
projections derived in section 1. For the years 2050 to 2150 we held the absolute age-profiles we obtained 
for 2050 constant (except for an adjustment for inflation and per capita GDP growth) and computed the 
macroeconomic aggregates by combining these profiles with the population forecast.  
The population data are likewise taken from national sources for past years while AWG figures were used 
for the years up to 2050.35 After 2050 the population is held constant in the baseline. However, keeping 
not only overall population size but also population structure at the 2050 level is clearly not realistic for 
most countries. This is why in a sensitivity analysis we also calculated national accounts on the basis of an 
explicit population projection that applies the AWG’s fertility, mortality and migration assumptions for 
2050 to the following years as well.  
Concerning the discount rate employed for deriving the present value of lifetime net tax payments, we 
relied on the AWG’s assumption of a real interest rate of 3% and inflation of 2% for future years. For the 
past we used the yield on long-term bonds issued by the respective government. The absolute payment 
profiles for the years after 2050 were extrapolated with the growth rate of GDP per capita, while GDP 
was expected to continue to grow with the rate assumed by the AWG for the period 2040 to 2050. The 
latter assumption reflects the method chosen by the Commission, and adopted also in section 2 of this 
paper, for the calculation of sustainability indicators. In order to make lifetime net tax payments of 
different cohorts comparable, they were discounted by the nominal growth rate of per capita GDP. While 
other methods are conceivable, this implies that the lifetime net tax payment is adjusted for increases in 
GDP per capita for successive cohorts. So when cohorts are shown to have the same lifetime net tax 
payments this does not imply that their absolute net tax payments are equal, but that their lifetime net 
payments in relation to per capita GDP at birth are similar.  
Obviously, all the methodological and data limitations that fully-fledged generational accounting exercises 
are subject to also apply to our more restricted approach.36 Moreover, since we follow the AWG’s 
presumption that most revenue and expenditure categories are not age-specific, while in fact generational 
accounting studies have shown a clear lifecycle pattern for them, the absolute value of our lifetime net tax 
payments should be interpreted with great caution. The same holds for the differences in the total lifetime 
burden between countries as well as between males and females. The latter depend on a sometimes 
arbitrary allocation of payments within households. This is why we chose to show either the lifetime net 
tax payments for women or for men for a specific country. The comparison between the lifetime net tax 
payments of different cohorts is, however, more meaningful. Nevertheless, our results should be treated 
with some caution when drawing policy conclusions. While the basic methodological framework we use 
is, in our view, adequate for analysing intergenerational distribution issues, we were confronted with 
considerable deficiencies on the data side. Our results should therefore be taken as an indication for what 
would be possible with a more complete data set.  
3.3   Results: Comparing the lifetime net tax burden of alternative adjustment strategies for different cohorts 
3.3.1  Results for the baseline 
In the baseline scenario we compare the intergenerational distribution of lifetime net tax payments of 
different cohorts under the assumption that the required adjustment is accomplished by increasing the 
 
34   The scaling factor reflects the difference between national accounts and AWG data for 2004. In the case of Germany, a 
similar procedure was applied to link east German to west German data for the years before reunification. In addition for 
Germany some budgetary items like e.g. development aid were assumed not to benefit or burden the resident population. 
Also therefore results are not fully comparable between countries. 
35   Survival probabilities for past years were obtained from the Human Mortality Database, University of California, Berkeley 
(USA), and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Germany). Available at http://www.mortality.org or 
http://www.humanmortality.de. As pointed out in section 1, the data from the AWG relate to the reference scenario and 
are not fully compatible with the adjusted headline scenario. 
36   See Havemann (1994), Raffelhüschen (1999), or Manzke (2002).   32
                                                
primary budget balance through any of the non-ageing related categories. This implies that the adjustment 
burden is distributed evenly over all age classes. The picture that emerges in this case is quite similar for 
the three countries considered (compare graphs 3.1 to 3.3). Earlier-born cohorts who have already entered 
into working age face the lowest burden, while later-born generations have to pay much higher net taxes. 
The burden increase is very steep between the 1980 cohort and the 2005 cohort (1970 and 1995 for 
Belgium). For subsequent cohorts, the burden declines slightly under the early adjustment strategy, while 
it keeps increasing – though less rapidly than between the 1980 and 2005 cohorts – under the gradual 
adjustment strategy (with the exception of Germany, where the burden declines after the 2005 cohort also 
under the gradual adjustment strategy). As could be expected, the lines for the early adjustment and the 
gradual strategy are quite close together in the case of Germany, which has a small sustainability gap, and 
are wider apart for the other two countries, where larger adjustment efforts are needed. In fact, if 
sustainability had already been attained and no further adjustments were required, the lines would match 
exactly. None of the strategies considered would, however, sufficiently burden currently living generations 
and alleviate future generations to achieve an even intergenerational distribution.37 
Visual inspection of graphs 3.1 to 3.3 already reveals that the early adjustment strategy leads to more even 
outcomes than the gradual one. In all three countries considered, it levies a higher burden on earlier-born 
cohorts who, compared to later-born cohorts, face a lower burden and relieves cohorts born later that 
face higher net tax payments than older cohorts. The crossing of the two lines, which indicates a lower 
burden under early adjustment for all later-born cohorts, is reached around the year 2016, while the 
highest burden under early adjustment is borne by the cohorts born about a decade earlier. For France 
and Belgium, the burden for generations born close to the middle of the 21
st century obtained under the 
gradual approach would be markedly higher than the peak burden for generations born around 2005 
under early adjustment. For Germany, the peak is attained around 2005 under both strategies and is 
slightly higher under early adjustment.  
 
37   A higher burden on currently living generations could be attained by concentrating the adjustment effort on the elderly. 
However, as pointed out earlier, searching for budgetary strategies that lead to an even intergenerational distribution is 























































































































in euro in euro
3.1 Belgium:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Men) 
of Cohort born in...
3.2 Germany:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Men) 
of Cohort born in...
3.3 France:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Women) 




















The conclusion that the early adjustment strategy leads to a more even intergenerational distribution is 
confirmed by the range of indicators displayed in table 3.1. The maximum burden, the difference between 
the maximum and the minimum burden and the standard deviation all point to a more favourable 
outcome under early adjustment. As already apparent from the graphs, the maximum burden for 
Germany is the only exception while the difference between the maximum and the minimum burden is 
about the same for that country. Nevertheless, as shown in table 3.1, even for Germany the standard 
deviation (and the coefficient of variation) is lower in the case of early adjustment.38  
                                                 
38   Indeed, at least for our sample of countries, the intergenerational distribution of the early adjustment strategy seems to be 
the more even compared to the gradual adjustment strategy the larger the initial sustainability gap. 


















   Women 58,200 65,100 12,800 15,600 20.4 24.1 76,000 78,800
   Men 55,200 65,800 12,900 16,100 23.0 27.9 66,900 73,300
Germany
   Women 56,300 56,300 29,600 30,400 25.7 26.2 140,400 139,600
   Men 52,500 52,500 26,500 27,400 26.7 27.3 121,600 120,500
France
   Women 55,800 78,100 19,900 27,000 19.7 25.9 117,700 134,900
   Men 49,400 72,600 18,500 25,600 23.9 32.3 92,300 109,400
*  In euros, deflated by per capita GDP growth
Maximum burden minus 
minimum burden*
Standard deviation* Coefficient of variation Maximum Burden*
 
3.3.2  Sensitivity Analysis 
In order to test the robustness of our results, we performed several sensitivity analyses. First, we tested 
the impact of an alternative assumption on the distribution of the adjustment burden over the different 
age groups. In fact, it seems quite reasonable to expect that the adjustment burden will not be spread out 
evenly over all age-classes but will be concentrated on the population of  working-age. Indeed, it is a well 
established outcome of fully-fledged generational accounting studies that the working-age population 
bears the highest net tax burden. We therefore ran a scenario with the adjustment burden only on persons 
between 20 and 59 years old. The outcome can be taken as an indication of the intergenerational burden 
distribution when sustainability is achieved e.g. by increasing social security contributions. Graphs 3.4 to 
3.6 show that the date after which newborns would prefer the early adjustment to the gradual strategy falls 
about a decade earlier for all three countries. Moreover, the difference between the two strategies 
increases for earlier-born cohorts. Nevertheless, the intergenerational distribution indicators depicted in 
table 3.2 indicate that the basic conclusion that early adjustment entails a more even distribution continues 
to hold. Indeed, all indicators except for the maximum burden for Belgium and Germany support this 
finding.  


















   Women 69,500 71,800 14,300 18,400 21.8 26.9 87,400 80,800
   Men 66,000 70,600 13,800 18,800 23.2 29.9 78,800 74,900
Germany
   Women 58,000 60,900 30,100 31,400 25.6 26.6 144,300 143,700
   Men 54,300 57,100 27,000 28,400 26.5 27.8 125,600 125,000
France
   Women 59,900 82,600 18,600 31,400 17.5 28.6 127,700 135,800
   Men 55,900 82,300 17,200 29,900 20.4 34.1 102,700 112,500
*  In euros, deflated by per capita GDP growth
Maximum burden minus 
minimum burden*














































































































early adjustment (working age)
gradual adjustment (working age)
3.4 Belgium:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Men) 
of Cohort born in...
3.5 Germany:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Men) 
of Cohort born in...
3.6 France:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Women) 
of Cohort born in...































We also tested the robustness of our results with respect to the assumption of constant population size 
and structure after 2050. This assumption is clearly unrealistic. It would involve not only a sudden jump in 
fertility rates but also high migration for some age groups. As it turns out, explicitly forecasting the 
population after 2050 actually reinforces our conclusions (see graphs 3.7 and 3.8 as well as table 3.3). For 
Germany, when the mortality, fertility and migration rates projected by the AWG for 2050 are also 
applied to the following years,39 the early adjustment strategy is preferred according to all 
intergenerational distribution indicators. The true burden of the cohorts born between 1980 and 2040 is 
overestimated in the constant population scenario. For France, the changes are less pronounced but go in 
the same direction.40  
                                                 
39   With the population forecast the overall population falls to 58.0 million and the dependency ratio to 51.8% by 2100 
compared to 75.4 million and 53.1% with a constant population. 
40   We did not run this exercise for Belgium.  


















   Women 53,100 59,500 30,400 32,100 25.9 27.3 137,800 140,700
   Men 47,000 52,200 25,800 27,500 26.2 27.7 117,100 119,000
France
   Women 52,700 78,100 18,800 26,300 19.1 25.9 113,900 134,300
   Men 44,800 68,400 16,300 23,700 22.3 31.4 87,200 105,000
*  In euros, deflated by per capita GDP growth
Maximum burden minus 
minimum burden*






































early adjustment with constant population after 2050
gradual adjustment with constant population after 2050
early adjustment with population forecast for years after 2050





































in euro in euro (2006)
3.7 Germany:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Men) 
of Cohort born in...
3.8 France:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Women) 




















As a third sensitivity test, instead of making net tax burdens of different cohorts comparable by adjusting 
for the increase in GDP per capita between the respective birth years, lifetime net tax rates can be 
calculated which show the relation between the present value of lifetime net tax payments and the present 
value of lifetime GDP per capita. The latter was calculated by discounting back to the year of birth GDP 
per capita observed over the lifetime taking into account survival probabilities. As shown for Germany, in 
this case the lines are smoother and the shapes also change somewhat. In the 1970s, the burden now 
increases for later-born cohorts while it falls in the baseline scenario (graph 3.9). This seems to be related 
to the negative interest growth differential that prevailed for many years of that decade and which distorts 


















































Lifetime Net Tax Rate (Men) 
of Cohort born in...
 


















   Women 3.0 3.3 2.2 2.2 24.1 24.6 10.2 10.4
   Men 3.0 3.3 2.0 2.1 24.8 25.5 9.2 9.4
*  In euros, deflated by per capita GDP growth
Maximum burden minus 
minimum burden*
Standard deviation* Coefficient of variation Maximum Burden*
 
The choice of the discount rate is a tricky question which has often been discussed in generational 
accounting studies.41 In our baseline scenario we used the interest rate assumed by the AWG for future 
years for discounting (real interest rate of 3% and inflation of 2%). For the past we relied on the yield on 
long-term bonds issued by the respective government. Thus, the real discount rate is not constant over 
the whole period. As a first step towards a sensitivity analysis concerning the discount rate it was assumed 
that the real discount rate was constant from 1970 onwards at 3% while leaving past inflation untouched. 
In the result, cohorts’ burdens are roughly unchanged compared to the baseline, with the largest changes 
obviously arising for older cohorts, and lines for the two scenarios cross in the same year (see chart 3.10). 
Moreover, our basic conclusion again remains unchanged (table 3.5). The second step of the discount rate 
sensitivity analysis was to change the level of the constant discount rate to 5%.42 This leads to two 
conclusions. First, cohorts’ burden is now lower than in the baseline scenario (or the ‘constant 3% 
scenario’), especially for cohorts born after the 1990s. Thus, assuming a higher discount rate gives the 
impression that intergenerational distribution is more even (see the direct comparison of the coefficient of 
variation with 3% and 5% in table 3.5). The second and more important conclusion is that when we 
assume a constant 5% discount rate the lines cross more or less at the same time as in the baseline 
scenario (2023 vs. 2016) and early adjustment still entails a more even distribution (see chart 3.11 and 
table 3.5). 
                                                 
41   See for example Accardo (1998) for France.  
42   This implies that for years after 2008 there is no identity anymore between the discount rate and the interest rate which is 







































early adjustment (constant d.r. 3%)





































early adjustment (constant d.r. 5%)
gradual adjustment (constant d.r. 5%)
early adjustment (constant d.r. 3%)
gradual adjustment (constant d.r. 3%)
in euro in euro
3.10 France:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Women) 
of Cohort born in...
3.11 France:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Women) 








































   Women 42,600 68,600 15,900 24,000 15.5 22.9 116,000 134,900
   Men 43,000 68,800 15,900 23,900 20.3 29.9 91,500 109,400
constant d.r. 5%
   Women 34,200 48,600 12,900 16,900 14.7 19.4 99,100 109,600
   Men 34,300 48,600 13,000 17,000 15.7 20.6 94,400 104,800
*  In euros, deflated by per capita GDP growth
Maximum burden minus 
minimum burden*
Standard deviation* Coefficient of variation Maximum Burden*
 
Finally, a first small step towards the outcome of a fully-fledged generational accounting exercise can be 
taken by distributing the burden of the sum of all budget categories not considered to be age-specific by 
the AWG to persons aged between 20 and 99 years in the scenario with an explicit population forecast for 
the years after 2050. With the impact of old-age expenditure like pensions, health and long-term care and 
education for the young determined separately, this is more in line with the age-profiles obtained in 
generational accounting studies. In this scenario the results change substantially, as illustrated by the case 
of Germany (chart 3.12). The overall burden is much lower now, backing our earlier note of caution on 
the reliability of absolute numbers. Moreover, the pattern over cohorts also changes somewhat. The 
increase for cohorts born after 1980 ends earlier and is significantly less steep. Moreover, the crossing of 
the lines for early and gradual adjustment occurs almost two decades earlier. However, our basic 






































early adjustment (with population forecast)
gradual adjustment (with population forecast)
in euro
3.12 Germany:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Men) 








Table 3.6: Intergenerational distribution indicators (budget categories assumed to be non-



















   Women 21,700 27,100 10,600 12,100 26.6 29.0 47,700 52,000
   Men 13,800 19,100 5,600 7,100 29.7 34.5 23,000 27,100
*  In euros, deflated by per capita GDP growth
Maximum burden minus 
minimum burden*
Standard deviation* Coefficient of variation Maximum Burden*
 
Overall, the conclusions derived under the baseline scenario seem to be quite robust with respect to a 
variety of conceivable variations in underlying parameters and assumptions. From the perspective of 
intergenerational burden distribution, a rapid adjustment of the primary balance to a sustainable level 
seems to be preferable to a more gradual approach. Nevertheless, care needs to be exercised when 
interpreting the results. Data restrictions only allowed us to compare cohorts born since 1970. So a 
substantial part of the living population could not be included in the analysis.43 Moreover, even for this 
period the underlying data are sometimes of poor quality or had to be estimated. Finally, whether a 
specific intergenerational distribution is preferred depends on normative presumptions that could be 
questioned. 
                                                 
43   These cohorts might be expected to be less affected by the budgetary consequences of demographic ageing. However, an 
extension to cohorts born since 1960 for France had little impact on the results. 
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Conclusion 
In this paper we analyse (budgetary policy responses to) fiscal sustainability against the backdrop of 
population ageing. With respect to the budgetary costs of ageing, the projections carried out by the AWG, 
which was established within the EU's Economic Policy Committee, can be considered as an important 
reference point. In its 2006 report (EPC and EC, 2006) the AWG estimates, on the basis of a scenario 
taken as a reference, that ageing-related changes in five specific expenditure categories – pensions, health 
care, long-term care, unemployment and education – can work out at an increase of the expenditure ratio 
of slightly more than 4% of GDP for the EU and close to 4.5% of GDP for the euro area44 in the 2010-
2050 period. However, such long-term projections typically come with a very large degree of uncertainty.  
After a detailed assessment of the projections for the ageing-related expenditure increases for individual 
countries, we illustrate the upside risks to the AWG's headline projections via a harmonised mechanical 
exercise that is mainly based upon the sensitivities reported for alternative scenarios considered by the 
AWG. This exercise incorporates, if applicable, more recent estimates for the further increase in life 
expectancy by 2050; assumes that the income elasticity of health care expenditure would remain constant 
at 1.1 throughout the projection period rather than converge to 1 by 2050 as in the AWG headline 
scenario; and takes into account an increasing importance of the formal sector in the provision of elderly 
care due to changing family structures and rising female participation rates. It shows, in particular, that 
plausible alternative assumptions on key parameters in the projections could significantly increase the 
AWG estimates of ageing-related increases in government expenditure in the 2010-2050 period. 
We consider a number of quantitative sustainability indicators to assess the sustainability of public 
finances in euro area countries against the backdrop of population ageing. While there is no clear-cut 
theoretical benchmark for fiscal sustainability, the 'conventional wisdom' is that continuously rising 
and/or extremely high debt ratios are unsustainable. Hence, in practice, quantitative indicators of 
sustainability gaps typically attempt to measure the fiscal effort required by a certain date to bring the debt 
ratio back to a sustainable path or level taking into account the projected budgetary impact of ageing and 
a set of assumptions (e.g. concerning the macroeconomic environment, the implicit interest rate on public 
debt and deficit-debt adjustments). We argue that the two quantitative indicators that are routinely 
considered by the EC (and that impose a 60% and a stable debt ratio by 2050 respectively) may be 
complemented by other indicators, e.g. imposing a balanced budget by 2050. 
While the exact numbers may differ significantly depending on the sustainability indicator used, the 
ranking of the countries on the basis of their sustainability gaps is relatively robust. Countries that 
currently record high fiscal surpluses (e.g. Finland) or have undertaken more important structural reforms 
to their pensions systems (e.g. Germany, Austria and Italy) tend to experience lower sustainability risks. 
All indicators confirm that, of the countries considered here (the euro area minus Slovenia, Malta and 
Cyprus), public finances are currently only sustainable in Finland. All other countries will have to adjust 
their fiscal policies sooner or later. 
Quantitative sustainability indicators such as those considered in this paper typically measure the size of a 
relatively 'early' adjustment effort aimed at closing the sustainability gap. However, this should not be 
interpreted as a policy recommendation: the indicators do not imply anything about the appropriateness 
of such an early adjustment effort to restore fiscal sustainability compared to e.g. that of a more gradual 
approach. In this connection, it should be stressed that, for many countries, implementing such an early 
adjustment effort would lead to high surpluses in the coming years and a rapid reduction of public debt 
ratios (and, in some cases, the building up of net financial asset positions). 
 
44   As the Report was published in the beginning of 2006 the EU excludes Romania and Bulgaria while the euro area 
excludes Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta.   41
The appropriateness of any specific budgetary strategy needs to be assessed on the basis of pre-defined 
criteria. If intergenerational equity is considered to be a relevant criterion in this respect, generational 
accounts or, more specifically, the total lifetime contribution of generations born in different years to the 
government’s primary balance may be an important indicator to assess the relative merits of alternative 
budgetary strategies. In this connection, the intergenerational implications of an 'early' adjustment strategy 
(an increase in the primary balance by 2015 that is sufficient to absorb the ageing costs and still end up 
with a balanced budget in 2050) are compared to those of a corresponding 'gradual' approach (that 
spreads out the fiscal adjustment over the whole 2008-2050 period) for three countries – Belgium, France 
and Germany – in this paper. 
A number of tentative conclusions can be drawn from the evolution of the total lifetime burden in this 
empirical exercise. First, a gradual adjustment is typically more favourable for older generations than for 
generations born after a certain date. Second, this date falls later, i.e. generations that are worse off under 
the gradual strategy are further away in the future if all generations contribute to the fiscal adjustment 
than if only generations of working age do. Third, the ‘early’ adjustment strategy, implying significant 
government surpluses in the coming years for the three countries considered, generally leads to flatter 
time profiles of the total lifetime burden – and, hence, may be considered more equitable – than the 
‘gradual’ fiscal adjustment. 
While these findings have to be interpreted with caution, not least due to data limitations, they are of 
particular relevance for the aforementioned upcoming revision of the medium-term objectives for fiscal 
policy defined in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact. If intergenerational equity is considered to 
be an important guiding principle in this respect, it could be made operational along the lines suggested 
above. If our tentative results were confirmed, e.g. with a more complete dataset, and if no further cost-
cutting reforms to pensions and care systems are implemented, an upward revision of these medium-term 
objectives to significant surpluses may then be warranted for many EU Member States.  
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The AWG projections for Belgium are based upon a projected increase in the old age dependency ratio from 26.2% 
in 2004 to 47.1% in 2050. Population of working age would decline by some 550,000 units (more than 8%) 
between 2004 and 2050. However, this decline would be fully 'absorbed' by the projected fall in unemployment and 
employment would even rise marginally in the period considered. Hence, average yearly activity growth would be 
very close to the assumed annual increase in labour productivity (some 1.7%). 
Against this background, the ageing-related expenditure increase between 2010 and 2050 is estimated at 6.6% of 
GDP. The bulk of the increase (about 5.1% of GDP) is accounted for by pension outlays. Health care spending is 
projected to increase only moderately (by around 1.2% of GDP) while long-term care would rise by 0.9% of GDP 
by 2050. Outlays for both unemployment and education spending would fall by some 0.2% of GDP in the 2010-
2050 period. 
2. Comparison with alternative projections 
In order to assess the risks of the AWG projections, a comparison with the national projections carried out by the 
Study Group on Ageing (that works under the responsibility of the High Council of Finance) may be useful. 
According to the most recent annual report of this Study Group (June 2007)45, ageing costs would amount to some 
5.6% of GDP between 2010 and 2050, i.e. significantly lower than estimated by the AWG. The Study Group 
projects a much lower growth of pension outlays (accounting for a difference of around 0.8% of GDP) and a much 
steeper fall in unemployment expenditure (accounting for a difference of some 0.6% of GDP) and, unlike the 
AWG, also explicitly takes account of the projected decline (of 0.4% of GDP in the period considered) in the 
outlays for family allowances. However, this difference between the AWG and the Study Group estimates is 
partially offset by more buoyant health care expenditure in the Study Group's projections (some 0.7% of GDP 
higher than in the AWG scenario) and the fact that the latter projections do not include the projected decline in 
education expenditure in the ageing costs although they are mentioned pro memoria (with the Study Group projecting 
a roughly similar decline as the AWG). 
With respect to the demographic hypotheses, a marked difference pertains to the migration assumptions. While 
total net immigration is significantly higher in the AWG projections, the age structure is more favourable in the 
Study Group projections: in the latter, net immigration in the age group from 15 to 39 years is higher but this is 
more than offset by lower immigration for older age groups. Mainly because of this different view on the age 
structure of migration, the demographic dependency ratio would rise less in the Study Group projections (to 45.4% 
by 2050) than in the AWG ones despite the considerably higher 2050 life expectancy assumptions used in the 
former (a difference of nearly 2 years for men and more than 2 years for women). 
In addition, the Study Group projects a much more dramatic fall in the unemployment rate than the AWG: despite 
a much smaller fall in the population of working age by 2050, the decrease in the number of unemployed would be 
considerably higher than that projected by the AWG (some 325,000 units compared with 150,000). 
Finally, contrary to the AWG, the Study Group incorporates the measures contained in the so-called Generation 
Pact (adopted in December 2005). The latter primarily aim at discouraging and restricting early retirement. 
According to the Study Group, they would have a (limited) favourable impact on the employment rate. 
All in all, employment growth would be slightly more buoyant in the Study Group scenario. As the assumptions 
with respect to labour productivity growth are roughly similar in both projections, this would translate into slightly 
                                                 
45   Available at: http://docufin.fgov.be/intersalgfr/hrfcsf/adviezen/PDF/viellissement_2007_06.pdf   45
higher activity growth in the Study Group projections (more than 1.7% on average in the 2010-2050 period 
compared to 1.65% in the AWG projections). 
With respect to pension expenditure, both projections use the same methodology and social policy assumptions 
(notably concerning the real increase in pension entitlements by 0.5% a year - in addition to their full indexation to 
prices - implying a strong relative decline of an individual pension with respect to the average wages through time). 
The different evolution of pension expenditure relative to GDP can be mainly traced back to the differences in 
macroeconomic and demographic assumptions, particularly concerning the more favourable demographic 
dependency ratio and employment rate in the Study Group projections. 
The difference between both projections with respect to health care expenditure (including long-term care) is of a 
methodological nature. The Study Group essentially takes into account a 'mechanical' impact of ageing by assuming 
that spending profiles by age cohort and sex remain constant while the increased life expectancy in the AWG 
reference scenario is partly matched by a higher number of years spent in good health. In addition, the impact of 
non-demographic factors would be more limited in the AWG projections, witnessed by a lower income elasticity of 
health care spending (declining from 1.1 in 2005 to 1 by 2050). An alternative scenario presented by the AWG (the 
'positive income elasticity of demand' case) is methodologically closer to the Study Group's approach as it assumes 
constant consumption profiles by age cohort (but still takes into account a lower income elasticity than the Study 
Group) and indicates a slightly more buoyant growth in health care expenditure: the increase in the 2010-2050 
period would be about 0.3% of GDP larger than in the AWG reference scenario but still some 0.6% of GDP 
below that projected by the Study Group. 
Finally, the more substantial drop in unemployment expenditure in the Study Group scenario results primarily from 
the slightly more benign macroeconomic assumptions and to a lesser extent from the fact that the Study Group 
takes into account a limited fall in the replacement ratio (compared to a constant level in the AWG projections). 
3. Risk assessment 
Overall, a simple comparison of the AWG projections with a relevant national alternative seems to suggest that 
projections of ageing costs for Belgium come with a large degree of uncertainty. Choosing the least favourable 
projection for each expenditure category (i.e. essentially replacing the AWG projection for health care and long-
term care by the Study Group alternative and not incorporating education expenditure) would imply that ageing 
costs could be as high as 7.6% of GDP in the 2010-2050 period. Alternatively, choosing the most favourable 
projection for each expenditure category would imply an estimate of the ageing costs of around 4.6% of GDP for 
the same period. 
However, the set of both projections does not necessarily reflect the boundaries of uncertainty as even the least 
favourable of the AWG and Study Group projections for individual expenditure categories may come with upside 
risks. 
In this context, one could question, for instance, whether the steep decline in the ratio between an individual 
pension and the average wage through time - implied by both the AWG and the Study Group projections - will be 
socially and politically sustainable, particularly in view of the growing importance of pension beneficiaries in the 
voting population. In this connection, the 2005 Report of the Study Group on Ageing indicates that an additional 
increase in real pensions by 0.5% a year would raise total ageing costs by 0.6% of GDP in the 2005-2030 period (no 
estimate is available for the post-2030 period). Hence, a simple rule of the thumb suggests that indexing pensions to 
nominal gross wages would raise the estimates of ageing costs by some 1.5% of GDP in the 2005-2030 period 
alone. The additional expenditure may amount to roughly 2.5% of GDP if the 2010-2050 period is considered. 
In addition, both projections do not take into account a potential shift to the formal sector in long-term care due to 
changes in family size and female labour force participation rates. According to an alternative scenario considered 
by the AWG, this could push up ageing costs in the 2010-2050 period by 0.2% of GDP. 
Finally, the Study Group's projection of health care expenditure may be significantly less favourable than the 
AWG’s but it still implies a more limited impact of non-demographic factors than that observed in the most recent 
decades. Against that background, the assumption in the AWG reference scenario of a declining income elasticity, 
from 1.1 in 2005 to 1 by 2050, may seem somewhat optimistic. 
Hence, while the AWG estimate of 6.6% of GDP is in the upper half of the aforementioned [4.6;7.6] interval, 
downside risks are not necessarily predominant. In this context, it should be stressed that the lower estimates for   46
                                                
pension and unemployment expenditure in the Study Group projections - that strongly determine the lower bound 
of the interval - are mainly driven by more benign macroeconomic assumptions that, for instance, were described as 
being 'on the sanguine side' by the IMF (2007).46 In addition, the Study Group explicitly acknowledges that the 
projected decline in the unemployment rate would require 'an active labour market policy' and may therefore not be 
consistent with a strict constant policy assumption. 
All in all, a cautious alternative headline estimate for ageing costs may be constructed by: 
•  keeping the AWG macroeconomic projections and expenditure estimates for pensions and 
unemployment and education expenditure; 
•  taking into account a shift to the formal sector as in the aforementioned AWG alternative 
scenario; 
•  and keeping the income elasticity used in the health care projections constant at 1.1 (rather than 
the gradual decline to 1 incorporated in the AWG reference scenario)47. 
This would amount to an ageing-related expenditure increase of some 7% of GDP in the 2010-2050 period. Taking 
into account a full indexation of individual pension entitlements to average wages could push this ageing cost up to 
around 9.5% of GDP. 
 
46  Belgium: 2006 Art. IV Consultation - Staff Report', IMF, March 2007  
 (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0789.pdf). 
47   The impact of an increase in the income elasticity from 1.05 (assumed in the reference scenario) to 1.1 on average over the 
2010-2050 period can be roughly estimated on the basis of a comparison of the AWG 'pure ageing' and 'positive income 
elasticity of demand' scenarios that take into account income elasticities of 1 and 1.05 respectively and would work out at 
around 0.2% of GDP.   47
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1. General description 
The latest AWG projections for Germany are based on a demographic scenario which implies a limited decline in 
the overall population of 6.5% between 2010 and 2050. However, the age structure will change dramatically with 
the dependency ratio increasing from 30.7% to 51.7%. The population of working age will shrink by 18.0%, while 
the elderly population will increase by 37.9%. However, the assumed increase in participation rates and the fall in 
structural unemployment will limit the decline in the number of employed persons to 13.4%. Overall, potential 
GDP growth should slow down from 1.7% to 1.2% per year despite an expected increase in labour productivity. 
It is projected that the ratio of ageing-related expenditure to GDP will increase by 3.9 percentage points between 
2010 and 2050, about the average for the EU and the euro area. While pension, health care and long-term care 
expenditure will increase by 2.6 percentage points, 0.9 percentage point and 1.0 percentage point respectively, 
expenditure for unemployment benefits and education is actually expected to fall by 0.2 and 0.3 percentage point.  
2. Comparison with alternative projections and risk assessment 
In order to assess the sensitivity and reliability of the results obtained by the AWG, the underlying assumptions as 
well as the outcome are compared with other available studies, especially a national study conducted by the Ifo 
Institute.48 With regard to the underlying demographic development, the projection employed by the AWG assumes a 
slower increase in life expectancy than the latest official population projection by the Federal Statistical Office.49 
This seems to be one of the main reasons why the AWG scenario shows a significantly lower dependency ratio in 
2050. According to a sensitivity test performed by the AWG, a further increase in life expectancy at birth by 1.6 
years for men and 1.3 years for women between 2010 and 2050 – which would largely match the Federal Statistical 
Office’s assumptions – would imply an additional increase in ageing-related expenditure of approximately 0.5 
percentage point in 2050 (0.2 percentage point for pensions, 0.2 percentage point for health care and 0.1 percentage 
point for long-term care). Even this scenario might still underestimate the decline in mortality rates as it implies an 
increase in life expectancy which is considerably lower than the almost linear increase of 2½ months per year 
observed in past decades. Moreover, there is a risk that net migration, which is anticipated to alleviate the decline in 
the population, might turn out to be considerably lower than expected. 
Concerning macroeconomic assumptions, the AWG projections regarding the participation rate are similar to those in 
the Ifo study with a somewhat higher starting level assumed for 2010 being offset by a slower increase afterwards. 
In any case, the impact of changes in the assumed employment rate on pension expenditure would be limited, 
according to the sensitivity analyses performed by the AWG.50 Labour productivity is anticipated to grow at a 
similar rate in both studies. The baseline assumptions on unemployment by the Ifo study deviate markedly from 
those by the AWG. However, the Ifo study authors themselves regard the baseline assumption, which is taken from 
a report by the Rürup Commission, as being potentially too optimistic. In their risk scenario, they therefore use a 
long-term unemployment rate quite similar to that used by the AWG. 
Turning to individual expenditure items, the increase in pension expenditure between 2010 and 2050 projected in the 
Ifo study (3.0 percentage points) is slightly higher than the increase in the AWG reference scenario. Numerous 
differences in the assumptions and the methodology of the two studies make it difficult, however, to trace the 
driving factors behind this discrepancy. Disregarding convergence of currently comparatively high pensions in East 
Germany to western levels as in the Ifo study should, for example, lead to an upward bias for pension expenditure 
increases. Risks related to already enacted legislation changes not taken into account in the AWG calculations 
                                                 
48   See M. Werding and A. Kaltschütz (2005), Modellrechnungen zur langfristigen Tragfähigkeit der öffentlichen Finanzen, ifo Beiträge zur 
Wirtschaftsforschung, Munich. 
49   Benefiting from higher net migration assumptions for the initial years, total population nevertheless is higher in the AWG scenario. See 
Statistisches Bundesamt (2006), Bevölkerung Deutschlands bis 2050, Wiesbaden. Reference is made here to the 1-W2 variant. The Ifo 
study is based on an older projection by the Federal Statistical Office.  
50   With a lower employment rate, GDP would be lower than in the baseline, but pension expenditure would also be dampened in the long 
run as fewer people would accrue pension rights. Moreover, the sustainability factor included in the pension adjustment formula leads to 
lower pension increases if employment falls. The effect of lower employment on other ageing-related expenditure has not been 
calculated by the AWG. The results of the risk variant of the Ifo study nevertheless suggest limited effects.   48
                                                
appear to be slightly on the downward side, according to the current perspective. A gradual increase in the statutory 
retirement age from 65 to 67 by the year 2029 – subject to a possible revision in future years – has now been 
enacted. This could lower pension expenditure by roughly ¼% of GDP in 2050.51 While the assumption that the 
dampening factors built into the pension adjustment formula would always be effective and never subject to escape 
clauses presented a clear upward risk to the AWG expenditure projections at the time, legislation has now been 
enacted which ensures that any skipped adjustment will be made up for in later years.  
Concerning health care and long-term care expenditure, non-ageing-related cost drivers can potentially play a large 
role in the future trend. Scenarios and sensitivity analyses performed by the AWG itself as well as in the Ifo study 
and by the OECD52 suggest substantial uncertainty in this respect. In the AWG reference scenario, the increase in 
the health expenditure ratio (without the special scheme for civil servants) projected by the AWG for the 2005 to 2050 
period is 0.6 percentage point and 0.5 percentage point lower than the increases anticipated by the OECD (cost 
containment scenario) and the Ifo study respectively. In the AWG reference scenario, an income elasticity of 
demand of 1.1 in the base year is assumed, converging to 1 in 2050. If income elasticity were to remain at 1.1 over 
the whole projection period, the increase in health expenditure would rise by 0.3 percentage point to 1.2 percentage 
points over the 2010-2050 period in the AWG projections.53 The health reform of 2006, which has not been taken 
into account in the latest AWG calculations, will probably not have a pronounced effect on long-term expenditure 
developments. 
For long-term care, the expenditure increase in the OECD projections is 0.2 percentage point higher than in the 
AWG reference scenario while there is almost no difference with respect to the Ifo study. A shift towards more 
formal long-term care would imply an increase in expenditure of 1.4 percentage points (2010-2050) according to 
AWG figures54 and of 2.2 percentage points (2005-2050) according to the OECD’s “increased participation” 
scenario compared to 1.0 percentage point in the AWG baseline. While the AWG calculations are based on a 
dynamic increase in long-term care expenditure per nursing case, unit costs so far were nominally fixed by law. 
However, legislation raising benefits has recently being enacted. In any case, it appears unlikely that expenditure per 
nursing case will remain unchanged until 2050.  
3. Conclusions 
All in all, a cautious alternative headline estimate for the increase in ageing costs may be obtained by adjusting the 
assumption on future life expectancy in the AWG reference scenario to that in the AWG high life-expectancy 
scenario. Health expenditure projections could be further adjusted to reflect a constant income elasticity of demand 
of 1.1. This also suggests an increase in health expenditure that is more in line with alternative studies. For long-
term care expenditure, the AWG’s increase in formal care assumption could be adopted. On the other hand, the 
estimated increase in pension expenditure could be reduced to take account of recent legislation changes. Adjusted 
in this way, the increase in the ageing-related expenditure ratio would amount to some 4.8 percentage points in the 
2010-2050 period.  
 
51   This estimate is based on policy simulations of an increase in the legal retirement age included in the November 2006 pension insurance 
report (Rentenversicherungsbericht), the Ifo study (additionally taking into account agreed exemptions) and calculations in German 
Council of Economic Experts, Jahresgutachten 2007/2008, p 180.  
52   See J. Oliveira Martins, C. de la Maisonneuve, and S. Bjornerud, “Projections of OECD health and long-term care public expenditures”, 
in Banca d’Italia (ed.), Fiscal Indicators, 2006. No figures are provided for 2010. 
53   This increase is approximated by adding the difference between the increase in the AWG’s positive income elasticity of demand and 
pure ageing scenario to the AWG’s reference scenario. 
54   This rise is approximated by adding the difference between the increase in the AWG’s ‘increase in formal care’ and ‘pure ageing’ 
scenarios to the AWG’s reference scenario.   49
 




According to the latest AWG projections for Greece, the overall population will decrease by 5.3% between 2010 
and 2050. In contrast to this moderate decline, population of working age will shrink by some 1.7 million units 
(about 23%) over the same period, while the elderly population will grow by 66%. Due to this change in the age 
structure, the old-age dependency ratio will more than double from 28.0% in 2010 to 60.4% in 2050. As the decline 
in working age population is partly compensated by an increase in the labour force participation rate (by 1.4 
percentage points, to 70%) and the fall in the unemployment rate (-1.6 percentage points, to 7.0%), the decrease in 
the number of employed persons is limited to 17.7%. Given that labour productivity is expected to slow down 
substantially, overall potential GDP growth is projected to fall from 2.9% to 0.8%. 
Against this background, the AWG estimates that expenditure on health care will increase by 1.4percentage points 
between 2010 and 2050, while spending on education and unemployment benefits is expected to remain broadly 
stable. There are no AWG projections available for either pensions or long-term care. 
2. Comparison with alternative projections 
In order to give a rough idea of possible future expenditure on pension and long-term care in Greece, alternative 
projections are used, in particular those included in the Stability Programme Updates. 
Projections for pension expenditure were included in Greek Stability Programmes up to the 2004/2005 Update. 
These figures were identical to the projections included in the 2002 Update of the Stability Programme, which were 
provided by the Hellenic Actuarial Unit. These projections mainly used the assumptions from the AWG 2001 
Ageing Report55 but took the effects of the 2002 pension reform into account. They showed an increase of 
10.4percentage points over the period 2010-2050. The same document foresaw an increase in health care 
expenditure of 1.4% of GDP over 2010-2050. These forecasts assumed a smaller increase in the old age 
dependency ratio than the 2006 AWG projections (28 percentage points against 34percentage points, as a result of 
both lower life expectancy for women – almost a year – and a higher fertility rate – 1.6 versus 1.5). Moreover, the 
2002 projections assumed a large increase in the overall participation rate (from 69.4% in 2010 to 77.1% in 2050, 
reflecting higher female participation) and a sharp reduction in the unemployment rate (from 11% in 2000 to 7% in 
2010, further dropping to 5.5% in 2050). Both assumptions are much more favourable than the reference scenario 
adopted by the 2006 AWG. 
Estimates for health and long-term care expenditure are provided by a recent OECD study56: and for health 
expenditure also by the 2006 AWG.  
a) Under comparable assumptions concerning the quality of extra life years, income elasticity of health 
expenditure, and the evolution of health costs, OECD projections for health care are slightly more conservative 
than those made by the AWG. For instance, assuming healthy ageing, a unit income elasticity, and no cost 
effect, both the AWG and the OECD project an increase in the spending ratio of, respectively, 1.0 of GDP over 
the period 2004-2050 and 0.6% of GDP from 2005 to 2050. However, the slightly different AWG reference 
scenario points to an increase in health costs of 1.4percentage points over the period 2010-2050 (1.7% over 
2004-2050), and different OECD scenarios point to expenditure increases of up to 2.8% of GDP over 2005-
2050. 
b) Baseline OECD projections assuming healthy ageing, zero income elasticity and a partial “Baumol effect” (i.e. 
that long-term costs per dependent increase by half of average labour productivity) indicate an increase of long-
                                                 
55   Report by the Economic Policy Committee on budgetary challenges posed by ageing populations: the impact on public 
spending on pensions, health and long-term care for the elderly and possible indicators of the long-term sustainability of 
public finances (October 2001). 
56   Oliveira Martins, Joaquim, Christine de la Maisonneuve and Simen Bjornerud, Projections of OECD Health and Long-
term Care Public Expenditures, in Banca d’Italia, ed., Fiscal Indicators, 2006.    50
                                                
term care spending by 0.8 percentage points over 2005-2050. In the same scenario, an increase in older workers’ 
participation rate to 70% (in line with the AWG assumptions) - and hence an increase in formal long-term care - 
results in extra spending amounting to as much as 2% of GDP over the projection period.  
3. Risk assessment and summing up 
The 10.4% of GDP increase over 2010-2050 projected by the Greek authorities in 2002 can only be taken as a 
lower bound due to the favourable demographic and macroeconomic assumptions. An IMF study following the 
2005 Art. IV consultation, drawing also on earlier projection exercises by the Greek authorities, suggests that more 
realistic estimates would put the increase at 12% of GDP.57 This is largely in line with the result of the 2001 AWG 
Ageing Report and forecasts in the recent OECD Economic Survey of Greece (Paris, 2007)58. The OECD used 
the 2006 AWG updated projections for the dependency ratio and the employment rate for a revision of the Greek 
pension expenditure projections, while keeping the same profile for the pension benefit ratio as in the 2002 official 
Greek projections. 
Although AWG health care projections do not appear over-conservative when compared to the OECD alternative, 
the underlying income elasticity of expenditure is rather low (1.1, declining to 1.0 over 2010-2050) compared to 
available estimates over different time spans (2.1 for 19972-2002; 1.6 for 1982-2002; 1.8 for 1992-2002). If, as a 
minimum, the elasticity were kept constant at 1.1 throughout the projection exercise, based on sensitivity provided 
by the AWG report, the spending ratio would increase by an extra 0.1 percentage point between 2010 and 2050. 
Putting together all available information, age-related expenditure on pensions, health and long-term care may be 
expected to rise by close to 15.4% of GDP over the period 2010-2050, 12% of which for pensions, 1.5% for health 
care (correcting the AWG reference scenario for a constant income elasticity of 1.1) and 1.8%59 for long-term care.  
 
57 Christiane .L. Roehler, Greece: Issues in Pension Reform, in IMF (2006), Greece: Selected Issues, www.imf.org. 
58   Summary available at www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/greece 
59   Linear intrapolation of available data.   51
 




The AWG projects that the old age dependency ratio for Spain will increase from 24.6%. in 2004 to 65.6% in 2050. 
However, the projected increase in the effective economic old age dependency ratio is even bigger, from 40% in 
2004 to 88% at the end of the projection period. Population of working age would decline by around 6.2 million 
(more than 21%) between 2004 and 2050, which would be only partially offset by the projected fall in 
unemployment and higher labour market participation rates. As a result, the total labour force would contract by 
1.6 million people and total employment would decline by some 646,000 units in the period considered. Hence, the 
average annual GDP growth rate would be 1.6%, slightly below the average labour productivity growth rate. 
However, average GDP growth would be well below that figure between 2030 and 2050, with growth rates at 
around 0.8%.   
Against this background, age-related expenditure is expected to increase by some 8.9% of GDP between 2010 and 
2050. The bulk of the increase is due to pensions (6.8% of GDP) and, to a lower extent, health care (2% of GDP). 
Long-term care expenditure would increase to a much lesser extent, by 0.3% of GDP, over the 2010-2050 period, 
while both unemployment benefits and expenditure on education are projected to decline marginally. 
2. Comparison with alternative projections 
No alternative national projections for total age-related expenditure are available for the AWG ones to be matched 
against. However, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MTAS) carries out projections on pension expenditure 
that can be used for comparison purposes. The last ones date back to July 2005. According to these projections, 
which only cover contributory pensions, outlays on pensions are expected to increase by 6.8% of GDP over the 
period 2010-2050.  
By contrast, the AWG projections comprise both the contributory system and the system for military and central 
government employees (CPE), who have their own pension scheme administered by the State. Netting out the 
pension outlays for the latter system - that would go down by 0.4% of GDP between 2010 and 2050 - the 
contributory pension expenditure increase projected by the AWG amounts to 7.1% of GDP, 0.3%. higher than 
projected by the MTAS.  
As regards the demographic scenario, the official national projections appear slightly more favourable. Total 
population is projected to increase by 2.7 million, compared to a 1.5 million rise in the AWG baseline demographic 
scenario. This difference stems mainly from higher net migration inflows in the national projections, especially until 
2010. By contrast, life expectancy and, therefore, the elderly population aged 65 and above is projected to expand 
faster in the AWG demographic scenario.  
The macroeconomic scenarios do not seem to be substantially different. Except for the period 2005-2010, when 
the MTAS projects higher real output growth, GDP growth turns out to be similar in both sets of projections. In 
addition, employment rates evolve in parallel until 2020 (from 2020 onwards, the MTAS does not make explicit the 
projection of this variable).   
The higher pension expenditure in the AWG projections can be traced back to the behaviour of disability, 
widowhood, orphan and surviving relatives’ pensions. However, old-age pension expenditure is higher in the 
MTAS projections - despite lower growth in the number of pensions - which suggests higher average pension 
benefits than in the AWG projections. 
It is difficult to compare both projections from a methodological point of view in that the MTAS does not offer 
detailed information on its model. In principle, both use broadly the same social policy assumptions. Consequently, 
the main differences seem to be due to the different demographic scenarios. 
 
                                                 
60   Co-authored by Francisco de Castro Fernndez.   52
3. Risk assessment 
Despite their high degree of uncertainty, the comparison with the MTAS ones might suggest that risks on AWG 
projections concerning pension expenditure would be broadly balanced. However, although more moderate than in 
other Member States, the decline in the benefit ratio (the ratio between the average pension and the average wage) 
might unveil an upward risk for the current pension projections. In this connection, any worsening of retirees’ 
living standards together with their increasing share in the voting population might be socially and politically 
unsustainable.  
Unfortunately, it is not possible to extend such a comparison to the other age-related expenditure items since there 
are no official projections. In any case, insofar as AWG health care expenditure projections reflect merely 
demographic factors and neglect the non-demographic drivers, the most important ones for explaining 
developments in this area in the recent decades, they may paint an optimistic picture. In this connection, it should 
be stressed that an alternative scenario presented by the AWG suggests that the increase in health care expenditure 
over the 2010-2050 period may be 0.2% of GDP higher than in the reference scenario if the elasticity of health care 
expenditure remains constant at 1.1 (instead of converging to 1 by 2050 as assumed in the reference scenario). 
Upside risks may also prevail for the AWG projection of long-term care expenditure. In this respect, the AWG 
does not take into account the possible implications of the recently approved Dependency Law which establishes 
an obligation, under certain criteria, to provide formal care services to dependants. An alternative scenario 
presented by the AWG indicates that an increase in formal care could raise long-term care expenditure by 0.8% of 
GDP over the 2010-2050 period. 
All in all, upside risks seem to dominate AWG projections, mainly on health and long-term care expenditure items. 
A cautious alternative headline estimate could consist of: 
•  keeping the AWG macroeconomic projections and expenditure estimates for pensions and 
unemployment and education expenditure; 
•  taking into account a shift to the formal sector as in the aforementioned AWG alternative 
scenario; and 
•  keeping the income elasticity used in the health care projections constant at 1.1 (rather than the 
gradual decline to 1 incorporated in the AWG reference scenario). 
This would amount to an ageing-related expenditure increase of some 9.9% of GDP in the 2010-2050 period.    53
 




According to the latest AWG demographic projections, the French population is expected to continue its upward 
trend, increasing by 6% between 2010 and 2050 (+3.6 million inhabitants). In the meantime, the old-age 
dependency ratio61 would climb from 25.8% in 2010 to 46.4% in 2050. Conversely, the share of working age 
population would decrease from 65.0% in 2010 to 57.5% in 2050. Nevertheless, the labour force would contract 
only slightly thanks to a rise in the participation rate and a fall in unemployment. Thus, GDP growth would be 
close to the growth of labour productivity. 
Against this background, the increase in ageing-related expenditure ratio between 2010 and 2050 is estimated at 3.1 
percentage points (pp), which is less than the average for the Euro area. Pension, health, long-term care outlays 
would respectively increase by 1.9 pp, 1.5 pp and 0.2 pp. Unemployment benefits and education spending would 
both slightly fall by 0.2 pp. 
2. Comparison with alternative projections 
2.1 The COR projections 
The COR (Conseil d’Orientation des Retraites62) carries out its own pension projections on a national basis. The 
AWG projections and the COR projections rely on the same model but the economic and demographic 
assumptions are different. In particular, the COR demographic projections are issued from the national statistics 
institute (INSEE). 
Comparison of different demographic projections used in pension expenditure forecasts 
(central scenarios)  AWG (2006)  COR (2007) 
Fertility rates  24:01.9  10:01.8  1.9 





Life expectancy at birth for men in 2050  82.3  83.8 
Life expectancy at birth for women in 2050 87.9  89 
The last COR forecast was released in November 2007. Compared to demographic projections used by the AWG, 
the fertility index and migratory balance assumed by the COR-INSEE are more favourable for working-age 
population and pension expenditure. Nevertheless, the higher life expectancy assumed by the COR raises the 
pension burden, all other things being equal.  
Comparison of macroeconomic and labour force assumptions used in pension expenditure projections 
(central scenarios)  AWG (2006)  COR (2007) 
Labour productivity growth  2005:1.2 Ö2020:1.8  2025-2050:1.7  1.8 (from 2012 on) 
Real growth rate   2005:2.2 Ö2025:1.8  2030-2050:1.6 2005-2015:2.5  2030-2050:1.8 
Unemployment rate  7 (2015 onwards)  4.5 (2015 onwards) 
Elderly (55-64) participation rate   25:42.3  10:54.1 25:43.8  10:51.5 
Economic assumptions are also different. Firstly, the COR suggests that the unemployment rate would fall to 4.5% 
of the working age population from 2015 onwards, compared to 7% in the AWG projections. All other things 
being equal, with a lower unemployment rate, pension outlays are the same but the level of GDP is higher so the 
expenditure ratio is lower. Secondly, according to the COR, labour productivity would grow each year at a constant 
                                                 
61   Defined as the number of people aged 65 and above relative to those between 15 and 64. 
62   The COR was set up in 2000 and is the French pensions policy council. It is in charge of the assessment of pension 
scheme sustainability. The COR can draw up reform proposals.   54
rate (+1.8%), whereas, according to the AWG, it would gradually accelerate from a yearly rate of +1.2% in 2004 to 
+ 1.7%63  from 2025 onwards. This higher labour productivity growth assumption leads to a lower pension 
burden64. Thirdly, the elderly participation rates in COR and AWG projections are different. According to AWG, 
the participation rate of older people (55-64) would increase by 11.8 pp, against 7.7 pp according to the COR. Thus, 
AWG projection assumes longer careers; the longer employees work, the higher pensions are. All in all, the 
COR assumptions lead to a more favourable financial requirement. According to the COR, the 
pension outlays would increase by 1 pp in 2020 and 1.6 pp in 2050, compared to 200665.  
2.2 Alternative health projections 
Many scenarios exist for public health projections; they are produced by the OECD66 and AWG, etc. Direct 
comparisons are not easy and, without being any more relevant67, the ’pure ageing’ scenario is the easiest one to be 
considered as a benchmark. It assumes that age-related spending per capita on health care remains constant and 
that costs evolve in line with GDP per capita.  
Comparison of a ’pure ageing’ scenario in health outlays projections  
(% of GDP)  2004/2005  2050  change 
AWG (scenario I)  7.7  9.5  1.8 
OECD (‘demographic effect‘ without the assumption of 
healthy ageing adjustments) 7  8.4  1.4 
OFCE68 7.7 9.7  2 
We compare the AWG pure ageing scenario with the projections of the OECD and of a French independent 
research institute OFCE69. The OFCE projections relied on the most recent demographic projections produced 
by INSEE and lead to a higher ageing gap. Nevertheless, direct causality can not be shown. Although the three 
projections are roughly based on the same logic, they can differ both in demographic and age-related spending 
profile assumptions. Eventually, the impacts of each assumption are very difficult to separate from one another.  
It should be noted that the AWG projection is average. Nevertheless, the pure ageing scenario is only one possible 
scenario. According to experts, it might not be the likeliest. Thus, both the OECD and AWG have produced 
several alternative scenarios: the overall increase in health expenditure respectively ranges from 0.3 pp to 3.8 pp and 
1.1 pp to 2.4 pp over 2005-2050. The central AWG scenario forecasts an increase in health expenditure ratio by 1.8 
pp between 2005 and 2010, which only slightly differs from the pure ageing scenario and from the reference 
scenario of OCDE (cost containment scenario, +1.7 pp).  
2.3 Long-term care projections 
According to the AWG, the French long-term care expenditure ratio is quite low70 compared to the average level 
in the euro area or in the European Union (0.3 % of GDP in 2004, against respectively 0.8 and 0.9). In the AWG 
baseline scenario, long-term outlays would increase by 0.2 pp between 2005 and 2050. A shift towards more formal 
long-term care would imply an increase in expenditure of 0.7 pp according to the AWG ’increase in formal care‘ 
scenario and of 2.6 pp according to the OECD’s ’increased participation‘ scenario. OECD scenarios are generally 
                                                 
63   The labour productivity trend assumption (1.7) comes from the assumption of a TPF growth equal to 1.1 divided by the 
labour share equal to 0.65.  
64   See the AWG or COR alternative scenarios for higher/lower labour productivity. 
65   Compared to 2015, the pension outlays would increase by 1 pp. 
66   See J Oliveira Martins, C de la Maisonneuve, and S Bjornerud, “Projections of OECD health and long-term care public 
expenditures”, in Banca d’Italia (ed.), Fiscal Indicators, 2006. 
67   Holding age-specific spending on health care constant over the projection period at the base year level implied that a large 
share of projected gains in life expectancy would be spent in poor health condition.  
68   Rigorously, the OFCE projections encompass both public and private health spending. Then we assume that public share 
remains constant, equal to 73% of total expenditure. 
69   Observatoire Français de la Conjoncture Economique, Lettre de l’OFCE n°281, 5 mars 2007, “La démographie à la 
rescousse de la protection sociale en France“, Mathieu Plane.  
70   Nevertheless, part of expenditure on dependants has been included by the AWG in heath care expenditure.    55
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more pessimistic as the increase in long-term care expenditure over 2005-2050 ranges from 0.9 to 2.9 pp while it 
only ranges from 0.3 to 0.7 pp under AWG scenarios. 
3.Risks assessment 
Demographic assumptions. A key feature for AWG projections is life expectancy at birth. An unexpected lengthening 
of the average lifespan would entail additional pension, health and long-term care expenditure. The AWG provides 
sensitivity tests of an additional increase in life expectancy at birth of 1.3 years for women (i.e. 89.2) and 1.6 years 
(i.e. 83.9) for men until 2050, which would largely match the INSEE-COR assumptions. Thus, according to AWG, 
a higher expectancy would lead to an additional increase in pension outlays of 0.6 pp in 2050. The impact of a 
higher life expectancy on health expenditure is estimated at 0.15 pp in 2050 compared to the central AWG scenario. 
Lastly, the impact of expectancy gains on long-term care would be nil according to AWG projections.    
On the other hand, the fertility index assumed by the AWG might appear slightly too low (from 1.89 in 2004 to 
1.85 in 2050). Indeed, the fertility index (1.9) assumed by INSEE is the mean of the index between 2000 and 2005. 
Yet, no alternative AWG scenario is based on higher fertility rates71. Besides, the annual migratory balance 
assumed by the AWG is lower than that assumed by COR (resp. + 60,000, +100,000). The migratory balance can 
have a potentially high impact on forecasts but no alternative scenario is produced by the AW
Macroeconomic assumptions. For the EU 15, the AWG group assumes labour productivity would grow yearly by 1.7% 
from 2030 onwards. For France, this figure fits the long-term average (1975-2003). Nevertheless, labour 
productivity has been growing more slowly since the beginning of the 1990s. A lower productivity growth is not 
unlikely: the AWG estimates that 0.25 pp less labour productivity growth lower from 2015 onwards would lead to a 
0.5 pp larger financial requirement over the 2004-2050 period for pension outlays.  
The participation rate of older workers (up 55 to 64 years old) is very low in France (38.3% in 2003) compared with 
the EU-25 average (42.7% in 2003). Nevertheless, the AWG assumes a high increase in older workers’ participation 
rate: +11.8 pp between 2005 and 2050, against +7.7 pp according to the COR. Yet, the effectiveness of measures 
adopted by the Government to prevent early retirement (deduction/premium, etc.) is still uncertain.  
 Non-demographic drivers. Public health care spending is determined by a complex combination of supply and demand 
factors, which may vary in the short and long term. In basic health care projections, spending is connected to the 
age structure of the population, the revenue per capita elasticity being assumed as unitary (see the ‘pure ageing‘ 
scenario above). Yet, the age effect and the revenue effect fail to fully explain the growth of public health spending 
during the past 30 years (see OECD). Yet, in the AWG central scenario, elasticity is assumed to decrease from 1.1 
in 2004 to 1 in 2050. This elasticity value seems even lower as policy implementation risks mainly arise in the health 
care expenditure field. Indeed, in the past, successive reforms have scarcely reduced their dynamism. Yet, no 
structural reform able to curb the expansion of health expenditure has been planned so far. 
Concerning education spending, the expected decline due to ageing is hardly likely. In particular, additional 
expenditure is planned for universities in order to improve tertiary education and research, both singled out in the 
Lisbon Strategy. 
4. Conclusion 
All in all, since the COR macroeconomic assumptions are too optimistic, we keep the AWG pension projections, 
using the higher life expectancy scenario. This leads to an increase in pension outlays by +2.4 pp between 2010 and 
2050. Health expenditure projections are adjusted to reflect a constant income elasticity of demand of 1.1 and a 
higher life expectancy, which leads to an increase in health expenditure of +1.8 pp between 2010 and 2050. For 
long-term care expenditure, the AWG ‘increase in formal care’ scenario is adopted (+0.4 pp). Lastly, the AWG 
computations for unemployment and education outlays are kept the same. Then the increase in the ageing-related 
expenditure ratio would be 4.1 pp in the 2010-2050 period.  
 
71   According to the sensitivity analysis carried out by the COR and compared to the central scenario (i.e 1.9), a drop in the 
fertility rate to 1.8 after 2010 increases pension expenditure by 0.8  pp by 2050. 
72   According to the sensitivity analysis carried out by the COR and compared to the central scenario (i.e +100,000), an 
annual migratory balance of 50,000 adults increases pension expenditure by 0.7 pp by 2050.   56
 




According to the AWG projections, the Irish population is expected to increase to 5.5 million in 2050 from just 
over 4 million at present. Within this total, the elderly population cohort (those aged 65 and over) is projected to 
more than treble over the period. As a result, a very large increase in the old-age dependency ratio is projected, 
from 16.5% currently to 45.2% in 2050. 
In total, ageing-related expenditure in Ireland is expected to increase by 8.1% of GDP between 2005 and 2050. The 
bulk of this (approximately three-quarters) is accounted for by higher pension outlays, which are projected to more 
than double, to reach 11.1% of GDP in 2050. Health care and long-term care spending are projected to rise by 
2.0% and 0.6% of GDP, respectively, over the same period. These increases are expected to be offset to a small 
degree by a reduction in education spending by 0.9% of GDP together with a decline in unemployment related 
expenditures of 0.1%. 
2. Comparison with alternative projections 
In order to assess the results of the AWG projections, it is useful to examine other studies on population ageing 
carried out for Ireland. There have been a number of reports on population ageing, many of which have focused on 
particular aspects relating to ageing. In addition, on the purely demographic side, in 2004, the national statistical 
agency in Ireland, the Central Statistics Office (CSO), produced population and labour force projections to 2036. 
Perhaps the most relevant in terms of the AWG projections, however, is a recent paper produced by the Economic 
and Social Research Institute74 (ESRI), which specifically examined the effects on public finances of ageing over 
the period to 2050. It is from this paper that the most direct comparisons and contrasts with the AWG report can 
be disseminated. 
In terms of demographic projections, there is quite a marked difference between the AWG projections and those 
contained in the ESRI report.  The ESRI projects that the population will increase by just over one million persons 
to reach 5.2 million in 2050, whereas the AWG study projects that the population will reach 5.5 million. This 
appears to be mainly explained by differing assumptions on migration, with the AWG projecting much higher net 
migration over the period to 2050 than the ESRI, although in contrast, the AWG figures for net migration in 2004 
and 2005 were significantly below actual flows. Of particular interest, however, is the changing age structure of the 
population, with the ESRI painting a more pessimistic picture than the AWG study. The ESRI estimates that the 
proportion of the population aged 65 and over will increase from 11% in 2005 to 29% by 2050, which is higher 
than the AWG projections. As a result, the ESRI projects that the old-age dependency ratio will increase from 
16.5% in 2005 to 51.5% in 2050, which is significantly above the AWG projection (45%). This is partly due to 
differing assumptions on mortality rates, with the ESRI expecting men and women to live longer than in the AWG 
study. 
As regards economic assumptions, the unemployment projections by the AWG appear overly optimistic, with an 
average rate of just 3.4% throughout the entire projection period. This would in effect constitute a near full 
employment situation between now and 2050. In contrast, the ESRI assumes a higher unemployment rate of 4% 
per annum, which appears more plausible. Similarly, the AWG projections for average GDP growth over the next 
decade or so appear somewhat high when compared with other medium-term growth projections for Ireland. 
The ESRI report estimates the costs of population ageing relative to GNP, whereas the AWG study is measured 
relative to GDP.75 According to the ESRI, old-age social welfare spending (i.e. pensions) is projected to treble 
from 3.2% of GNP in 2010 to 9.3% of GNP in 2050. Long-term care costs over the same period are projected to 
increase from 0.8% of GNP to 2.4% by 2050. Health care costs are projected to rise from 7.4% of GNP in 2010 to 
                                                 
73   Co-authored by Diarmaid Smyth.  
74  ‘Assessing Age-Related Pressures on The Public Finances, 2005 to 2050’, by Alan Barrett and Adele Bergin, in ‘Budget 
Perspectives 2006’, ESRI, October 2005. 
75  In Ireland, GDP typically exceeds GNP due to the open nature of the Irish economy and the presence of a large 
multinational sector. However for purposes of comparison, this difference is not likely to be significant.   57
                                                
11.2% in 2050. These three factors combined result in ageing-related costs rising by 11.5% of GNP between 2010 
and 2050. Although not directly comparable, these projections are higher than the rate of increase projected in the 
AWG report, which might lend support to the view that there are upside risks to the AWG projection.  
3.Risk assessment 
The AWG study shows that the effects of population ageing are likely to be quite marked in Ireland, with age-
related public spending projected to rise by 7.9% of GDP between 2010 and 2050. This increase is well above the 
EU average, although this partly reflects the fact that Ireland is starting from a relatively low base given its current 
young population profile. It must be recognised, however, that such projections are subject to much uncertainty, 
particularly for smaller and more open economies like Ireland. This is also evident from a study conducted by the 
ESRI, which has differing long-term demographic and economic projections. This latter report showed higher 
estimated costs from population ageing. 
An alternative headline estimate for ageing costs using the AWG scenarios would involve: 
•  taking the AWG assumptions on demographics and macroeconomic estimates as given; 
•  increasing the AWG projections for health care spending by taking the assumption of a constant 
income elasticity of 1.1 throughout the period, which raises health care costs by 0.4%; 
•  raising the AWG projections for long-term care by allowing for an increase in formal care 
provision, which pushes up ageing costs by a further 0.3%. 
This alternative scenario would result in an increase in ageing costs by 8.6% of GDP between 2010 and 2050 and 
would be closer to the ESRI estimates. 
In conclusion, it must be borne in mind that, despite the AWG projections, Ireland is relatively well placed to deal 
with the effects of population ageing. This is based firstly on the premise that Ireland has more time to prepare for 
population ageing given the current age structure. Secondly, Ireland has a low level of debt (the second lowest debt-
to-GDP ratio in the euro area) as well as being a relatively lightly taxed economy. Thirdly, Ireland has already begun 
to prepare for population ageing, through the National Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF).76 That said, such studies do 
highlight the need for more to be done to combat the challenges posed by population ageing as the NPRF in itself 
will not be sufficient to insure against the likely future costs of population ageing. 
 
76  The NPRF was set up to pre-fund future pension costs, with 1% of GNP invested per annum up to 2055, with 
withdrawals from the fund permitted from 2025 onwards.   58
 




According to the demographic projections underlying long-term fiscal forecasts by the AWG, the old-age 
dependency ratio77 will rise from 28.9% in 2004 to 62.2% in 2050. Population of working age is expected to 
decline by some 9.2 million units (about 24%) over the same period. The decline in employment will be less 
pronounced (about 12.0%, 2.6 million units78) thanks to the projected increase in the job market participation rate 
(from 62.6% to 70.2%) and fall in the unemployment rate (from 8.4% to 6.5%). As a result, the average yearly 
growth of GDP would be lower than that of labour productivity (by about 1.3% and 1.6%, respectively).  
                                                
Against this background, in its ‘reference scenario’, the AWG estimates that age-related expenditure will increase by 
2.3% of GDP between 2010 and 2050, to 28.0%. Almost half of the increase (1.1%) is accounted for by health care. 
Spending for both long-term care and pensions is projected to increase by 0.7%. The increase in expenditure would 
peak in 2040 at 3.3% (1.9% of which would be for pensions). 
2. Comparison to alternative projections 
There are no truly alternative national projections of the costs of ageing for the public budget: the sole producer of 
national projections, Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (RGS, the State Accounting Office within the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance), participates in the AWG.  
However, RGS also publishes annual projections concerning some age-related expenditure items based on an 
alternative demographic and macroeconomic scenario provided by Istat (the national statistical institute).79 
According to the latest Istat release (autumn 2005), in the long run the fertility rate will be equal to 1.6 children per 
woman instead of 1.4, while life expectancy will be about one year higher. Average yearly growth is also 0.1-0.2% 
higher. As a result, over the 2005-2050 period, pension expenditure decreases by 0.3 percentage point of GDP, 
whereas under the AWG baseline scenario, it rises by 0.4 percentage point of GDP. The dynamics of the other 
expenditure items considered in the exercise (health care and long-term care) are instead basically the same under 
both scenarios.  
Alternative projections for health and long-term care are provided by a recent OECD study.80 Under 
comparable assumptions about the quality of extra life years, income elasticity of expenditure, and the evolution of 
costs, OECD projections for health care are broadly in line with those by the AWG. For instance, assuming healthy 
ageing, unit income elasticity, and no cost effect, the AWG and the OECD project an increase in the spending ratio 
of, respectively, three-quarters and one half of a percentage point of GDP over 2004-2050. Due to differences in 
the way assumptions are framed, a similar comparison for long-term care is not feasible. 
3. Risk assessment 
Higher life expectancy. The AWG has performed a sensitivity analysis, using more optimistic assumptions concerning 
life expectancy. In particular, a further 15% decrease in mortality rates at all ages is assumed to materialise gradually 
over the projection period. For Italy, this entails an increase in life expectancy in 2050 with respect to the baseline 
AWG scenario of 1.6 and 1.3 years for men and women, respectively. In turn, this translates into an increase in age-
related expenditure of 0.6 percentage point of GDP due to pensions (0.3%), health care (0.2%) and long-term care 
(0.1%). As mentioned above, the most recent Istat projections have already forecast for 2050 a life expectancy 1.0 
years above the baseline AWG scenario for men and 0.8 years for women. As a result, it can be estimated that the 
 
77  Defined as the ratio between the population of 65 years or more and the population from 15 to 65 years old. 
78   The change is calculated with respect to 2003. 
79   Ragioneria generale dello stato, “Le tendenze di medio-lungo periodo del sistema pensionistico e socio-sanitario”, 2006.  
80  Oliveira Martins, J. and de la Maisonneuve, C. (2006), “The drivers of public expenditure ion health and long term care: 
an integrated approach”, OECD Economic Studies, vol. 43 (2).    59
                                                
most up-to-date demographic projections entail age-related expenditure almost 0.4 percentage point of GDP higher 
than the baseline AWG estimates.81  
Income elasticity of health care expenditure. Another risk to AWG projections comes from the assumption of a rather low 
(and declining) income elasticity of health care expenditure (from 1.1 to 1 over 2005-2050, as against an average of 
1.22 over 1982-2002). Although an even lower elasticity of 0.84 was observed over 1992-2002, this mostly reflected 
policy measures taken between 1992 and 1997 which cannot be taken to have had a permanent effect. In fact, after 
going down by about 1 p.p. of GDP over the 1992-1997 period, health spending rose by 1.5% over 1997-2006 
(about 60% of the overall increase in public spending over the same period).  
Based on the sensitivity analysis provided by the AWG report, dropping the assumption that elasticity declines over 
time, and assuming it stays constant at 1.1 over 2010-2050, entails an extra increase of 0.3% of GDP in health 
expenditure over the period considered.  
Long-term care. Increases in life expectancy and changes in family structure could require more public support than 
currently provided. According to AWG projections, in an alternative scenario with increased provision of formal 
care, spending would increase by a further 0.9% of GDP compared to the reference scenario.82    
Political risks. Forecasts concerning Italian pensions assume a timely and complete phase-in of the pension reforms 
decreed in the previous years. In particular, the 1995 pension reform introduced a notional defined contribution 
system, in which benefits also depend negatively on life expectancy at retirement. Due to the increases in life 
expectancy, implementation of the regular actuarial updates will significantly affect the amount of benefits. These 
adjustments are estimated to contain the projected increase in expenditure by almost 2% of GDP. Together with 
the indexation of post-retirement benefits to prices instead of wages, introduced by the   
1992 reform, the new NDC rules entail a sharp reduction in the ratio of the average benefit to per capita GDP, 
which could prove socially unsustainable. The first adjustment, due in 2005, was indeed postponed.83  
4. Summing up 
Modification of the AWG reference scenario projections to take into account (a) more recent estimates of future 
increases in life expectancy, (b) higher income elasticity of health spending, and (c) the impact of ageing and 
changes in family structure on the provision of formal long-term care entails an additional increase in age-related 
public spending of about 1.5% of GDP over 2010-2050, taking the total to about  3.5 percentage points. 
Finally, policy implementation risks arise with respect to pensions. They are especially difficult to quantify as, by 
their very nature, they reflect entirely discretionary decisions.  
 
81   Forecasts by the RGS do not show such an increase since the budgetary and macroeconomic effects of higher life 
expectancy are more than offset by the effects of higher fertility. 
82   In OECD estimates, an increase in older workers’ participation rate to 70% (in line with the AWG assumptions) results in 
extra long-term care spending of as much as 4% of GDP over and above the baseline. 
83  Based on a recent agreement between the Government and trade unions, the update is now expected to take place in 
2010. At the same time, updates should from now on be made every 3 years. Moreover, already decreed increases in the 
minimum retirement age have been partly postponed. The combined impact on expenditure of such policy changes is 
expected to be negligible by the Government (Italy’s stability programme, 2007 update). The Government has also 
announced that a technical commission will examine the issue of the adequacy of the replacement rate of pensions, with a 
focus on workers with a discontinuous working history.      60
 
Fiche on AWG projections for Luxembourg84 
 
 
1. Description of AWG projections 
The AWG projections for Luxembourg are based upon a projected increase in the old age dependency ratio from 
21.0% in 2004 to 36.1 p.c. in 2050. At the same time, population of working age would increase by 30.9% between 
2004 and 2050 due to buoyant net immigration, equal to 3,000 persons a year throughout the projection period. 
Total employment would increase even more sharply, by 1.2% a year on average over the 2010-2050 period owing 
to higher participation rates (positive impact equal to 0.1% a year) and especially to a big increase in the number of 
cross-border workers (positive annual impact equal to 0.4% on average). As labour productivity would by 
assumption expand by about 1.8% a year over the same period, average yearly GDP growth would reach 3% from 
2010 to 2050. 
Against this background, the ageing-related expenditure increase between 2010 and 2050 is estimated at 8.4% of 
GDP. The bulk of the increase (some 7.6% of GDP) is accounted for by pension outlays. Health care spending is 
projected to increase by some 1.0 p.c. of GDP while long-term care would rise by 0.5% of GDP from 2010 to 
2050. Outlays for unemployment and education spending would fall by 0.1% and 0.7% of GDP, respectively, in the 
2010-2050 period. 
2. Comparison with alternative projections  
Projections carried out by Banque Centrale du Luxembourg (BCL)85 are a convenient benchmark to assess the 
risks inherent in the AWG forecasts86, although systematic comparison with the AWG is complicated by the use of 
different sources, methodologies and assumptions.  
A marked difference between the AWG and BCL projections is the assumed number of immigrants, with 
respectively 3,000 and 4,000 persons on average over the entire projection horizon. The impact on the projection 
results is difficult to assess, but it should not be overestimated. The number of cross-border workers is actually 
calculated in a residual way in the two sets of projections, in order to close the gap between the employment level 
compatible with the selected rates of economic and productivity growth on the one hand and the evolution of the 
resident labour force on the other hand. A decrease in the assumed number of immigrants is automatically matched 
by an increase in the number of cross-border workers in such a framework. Demographic assumptions other than 
immigration (in particular, birth rates and life expectancy) are very close in the two sets of projections. 
Macroeconomic variables are quite similar in the two sets of projections. For instance, the rate of economic growth 
observed over the long term is 3% by assumption both in the AWG projections and in the baseline BCL scenario. 
Productivity growth would reach 1.8% a year on average in the AWG projections and 2% in the BCL baseline 
scenario. On the other hand, the AWG projections rest on a steeper increase in the labour force participation rate 
of women over the 2003-2050 horizon (female participation rate in 2050 higher than the 2003 rate by 7.5% in the 
AWG projections and by 5% only in the BCL baseline).  
As far as pensions are concerned, the AWG projections seem uncontroversial. According to the AWG, total 
pension expenditure would increase by 7.6% of GDP over the 2010-2050 horizon, compared to 5.6% in the BCL 
baseline. Most of this discrepancy probably stems from the different coverage in the two sets of projections. The 
coverage of the AWG projections is larger, to the extent that they include the pension systems of public sector 
employees (“special pension regimes”), whereas BCL projections are confined to the private sector segment of the 
pension regime. In 2005, the special regimes accounted for about 23% of total pension expenditure (source: IGSS).  
                                                 
84   Co-authored by Muriel Bouchet.  
85  See BCL Working Paper n°23, available on the Internet site www.bcl.lu, for a description of the BCL model and its 
underlying assumptions.  
86  The Inspection Générale de la Sécurité Sociale also carries out pension projections, but the latter were used as an input in 
the AWG report and are therefore not independent from the AWG projections.   61
                                                
Another difference between the two sets of projections is that the AWG confined itself to the 2004-2050 
horizon, which may be deemed too short in the specific case of Luxembourg, where short-term fiscal 
indicators are distorted by the large inflow of cross-border and foreign workers recorded over the last 
decade. This trend gave way to a steep increase in social contributions not matched by commensurate 
developments on the expenditure side. This mismatch explains most of the significant budgetary 
surpluses, which are bound to fade away unless high economic growth and the correlative inflow of cross-
border workers are sustained throughout the projection horizon. All these developments will unfold over 
a long period of time, hence the need for a long projection horizon that will encompass the life-cycle of 
all the cross-border workers currently employed. The BCL projections extend to 2085 and illustrate that 
fiscal deterioration would continue between 2050 and 2085. Total pension expenditure would increase by 
1.2% of GDP over this sub-period, on top of the aforementioned 5.6% projected over the 2010-2050 
period in the BCL model.  
Health care expenditure would go up by 1.0% of GDP from 2010 to 2050, according to the AWG reference 
scenario, where the income elasticity of demand is equal to 1.1 in the base year and will converge to 1.0 by 2050. 
The BCL baseline projection points to a larger expenditure increase, equal to 1.6% of GDP over the same period. 
In this respect, the BCL baseline is quite close to an alternative scenario, namely the AWG reference projection 
adjusted in order to keep the income elasticity equal to 1.1 throughout the 2010-2050 period. Under this alternative 
scenario, health care expenditure would actually increase by 1.4% of GDP from 2010 to 205087, which is quite 
close to the BCL estimate. Based on past developments, the latter estimate implicitly assumes that the income 
elasticity of demand would be higher than 1.1 for the two segments of the insured population, namely residents and 
cross-border workers (as well as their relatives). However, this higher elasticity in BCL projections is compensated 
to a large extent by an additional, “dampening” effect. BCL projections do actually take into account the 
dampening effect on average health expenditure per capita of the higher number of cross-border workers projected 
in the future, which is not the case in the AWG projections. Average expenditure per capita of the cross-border 
population and of their relatives is structurally below the corresponding figures for the resident population (about 
40% less in 2006).  
The AWG expects long-term care expenditure to increase by 0.5% of GDP between 2010 and 2050, namely by 
about 6% a year in nominal terms. This rate of growth seems quite limited compared to the trend observed since 
the inception of the system in 1998. In particular, spending pressures may be higher than estimated if there is a shift 
towards more formal care due to changes in family size and female labour force participation rates. According to an 
alternative scenario considered by the AWG, this could raise ageing costs in the 2010-2050 period by 0.3%of GDP. 
As regards education, expenditure would decline by 0.7% of GDP between 2010 and 2050, according to the 
AWG. The latter figure seems overestimated for three reasons: (i) expenditure – mostly compensation of 
employees – may prove very sticky; (ii) Luxembourg does not perform well in international comparisons (e.g. in the 
OECD PISA rankings), which may induce Luxembourg to increase in a sustained way expenditure per pupil; (iii) 
the University of Luxembourg is still a young institution. The number of students may grow steeply in the future.  
Unemployment expenditure as a percentage of GDP should be relatively stable over the projection 
horizon. 
3. Risk assessment 
Long-term projections are even more uncertain in the case of Luxembourg than for most other EU 
countries. The AWG and BCL projections are vulnerable to several common risks on top of the risks 
observed in other countries (such as forecast errors related to life expectancy assumptions): 
•  macro-economic variables are quite volatile. It is therefore more difficult than in other countries 
to pinpoint the “appropriate” long-term rate of real GDP growth. The latter is set equal to 3% a 
year in the two sets of projections, which is quite high by EU standards. Should the rate of growth 
 
87  The average income elasticity of demand reaches 1.05 in the AWG reference scenario. The impact of an increase in this 
average elasticity over the 2010-2050 period from 1.05 to 1.1 can be estimated on the basis of a comparison between the 
AWG “pure ageing” and “positive income elasticity of demand” scenarios that take into account income elasticities equal 
to 1.0 and 1.05 respectively.   62
decline to 2.2% a year on average over the projection horizon, pension expenditure in the private 
sector would increase by 7.8% of GDP from 2010 to 2050 according to the BCL model, instead 
of 5.6% under the baseline BCL scenario.  
•  the very large inflows of immigrants and cross-border workers further complicate long-term 
projections. The future inflows and their age composition are difficult to apprehend and the 
future behaviour of the large inflows observed in the recent past is also quite uncertain (e.g. 
duration of the average careers of cross-border workers, average incomes, etc.). 
•  the reserves of the private sector pension regime account for 22% of GDP for the moment. 
Therefore, the way they are invested has a significant impact on future budgetary indicators. It is 
assumed in the BCL baseline that the nominal, implicit yield on reserves will reach 4.5% a year on 
average. Should this return increase by 1% a year, the total revenue of the pension regime would 
be 0.4% of GDP above the baseline in 2050. This would represent 7% of the expenditure increase 
projected in the BCL baseline over the 2010-2050 period. 
•  in line with the current legislation in Luxembourg, both the AWG and the BCL projections 
presuppose that pensions are adjusted to real wage developments (in addition to being indexed to 
prices). Should this adjustment be suspended over the 2010-2020 period, the increase in 
expenditure over the 2010-2050 horizon would drop from 5.6 to 3.7% of GDP in the BCL model 
(1.9% of GDP less). Such a suspension would imply a 16% decline in pensions compared to the 
baseline figure. A suspension of indexation over the entire projection period does not seem 
reasonable, as pensions would be 56% below the baseline in 2050 in such a case. 
In this context, a cautious alternative headline projection of the ageing cost could consist of: 
•  keeping the AWG's projections for pension expenditure (+7.6% of GDP from 2010 to 2050) and 
unemployment and education spending (-0.1% and -0.7% of GDP respectively); 
•  increasing the AWG projections for health and long-term care expenditure by taking into account 
a constant income elasticity of 1.1 for the 2010-2050 period and a gradual shift to the formal 
sector in the provision of long-term care as assumed in an alternative scenario presented by the 
AWG. 
This would amount to additional expenditure of around 9.1% of GDP over the 2010-2050 period, i.e. more than 
the AWG headline estimate (+8.4% of GDP). The 9.1% of GDP estimate is very tentative. For instance, it 
presupposes that two aforementioned risk factors (upside or downside), namely (i) lower GDP growth than 3% a 
year and (ii) suspension of the indexation of pensions to real wages, will either not materialise over the projection 
period or will cancel each other out.   63
 




The AWG projections for the Netherlands are based upon a projected increase in the old-age dependency ratio 
from some 21% in 2004 to 41% in 2050. Population of working age would decline by some 400,000 units (close to 
4%) between 2004 and 2050. However, this decline would be offset by the projected increase in the employment 
rate: employment would rise by some 0.1 p.c. a year in the period considered. Hence, average yearly activity growth 
would be marginally higher than the assumed annual increase in labour productivity (some 1.6%) and work out at 
1.7%. 
Against this background, the ageing-related expenditure increase between 2010 and 2050 is estimated at 5.2% of 
GDP. The bulk of the increase (some 3.6% of GDP) is accounted for by pension outlays. Health care spending is 
projected to increase only moderately (some 1.1% of GDP between 2010 and 2050), while expenditure on long-
term care would rise by 0.6% of GDP by 2050. Outlays for education spending would fall slightly by some 0.1% of 
GDP, while unemployment expenditure would remain constant with respect to GDP in the 2010-2050 period. 
2. Comparison with alternative projections 
In March 2006, the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB) published a study on 'Ageing and the sustainability of 
Dutch public finances'. This study uses a general equilibrium approach, implying, for instance, that private savings 
and labour supply are determined endogenously. However, the macroeconomic parameters used in this study are, 
all in all, relatively similar to those in the AWG projections, while the demographic projections appear to rely on a 
smaller projected increase in life expectancy up to 2050. 
While a detailed comparison with the AWG projections is complicated by the fact that the base year differs (2006 in 
the CPB study) and the exact definition of age-related expenditure categories does not always seem to match that of 
the AWG equivalents, the CPB appears to project a much higher increase in age-related expenditure than the 
AWG. For the 2010-2050 period88, for instance, total age-related expenditure would rise by around 6% of GDP 
according to the CPB, i.e. significantly more than what the AWG anticipates. 
Turning to individual expenditure categories, the biggest difference between both sets of projections 
appears to concern health care spending. This expenditure category (that includes long-term care in the 
CPB study) would expand by 3.8% of GDP in the 2010-2050 period according to the CPB, while the 
AWG anticipates a much smaller increase for that period. This difference can be traced back to a broader 
definition of long-term care (included in the CPB's concept of health care) and different projection 
methodologies. With respect to the latter, the CPB mechanically accounts for population ageing by 
keeping age profiles for health care expenditure constant and using a unitary income elasticity. The AWG 
reference scenario is based upon the assumption that half of the increase in life expectancy is spent 'in 
good health' (implying a flattening of the curve measuring health care expenditure by age cohort) while 
the income elasticity would converge from 1.1 to 1 by 2050. An alternative scenario for health care 
expenditure presented by the AWG, the so-called pure ageing scenario, may be methodologically closer to 
the CPB projections as it is based upon constant consumption profiles by age cohort, but also indicates a 
much smaller increase in health care spending than that projected by the CPB. 
With respect to pensions, the CPB projections appear to indicate a significantly smaller increase (of some 2.5% of 
GDP) than that projected by the AWG (3.6% of GDP). It should be stressed that both projections assume that 
individual pension entitlements will continue to be indexed to gross wages (as pensions are defined as a fraction of 
the minimum wage). Hence, the difference may be primarily due to the different demographic assumptions: 
according to the sensitivity analysis performed by the AWG, an upward revision of the life expectancy assumption 
by 1 to 1.5 years by 2050 would increase pension expenditure by 0.5% of GDP by that year; and the difference in 
life expectancy in 2050 between both studies is 1.5 years for men and 2.6 years for women. In this connection, it 
should be mentioned that the CBS (the Dutch Statistics Bureau) has recently published new demographic 
                                                 
88   Projections for 2010 and 2050 are not published in the aforementioned study but were kindly provided by the CPB.   64
                                                
projections that, in terms of the projected change in life expectancy, are closer to the AWG assumptions (even 
though the latter still point to higher life expectancy in 2050, especially for women). In a February 2007 memo89, 
the CPB estimates that adjusting the fiscal projections to these new demographic assumptions would widen the 
sustainability gap in the Netherlands considerably. 
Education expenditure would rise by 0.2% of GDP while unemployment benefits would remain constant to GDP 
in the CPB projections.  
Apart from the expenditure projections, the CPB also looks at the revenue side of the government budget. Total 
revenue is projected to rise by close to 1% of GDP in the 2010-2050 period. This increase is driven by both income 
taxes (including social security contributions) and indirect taxes. A large part of this increase is explicitly attributed 
to the 'older' population. Income tax on pensions (including second-pillar ones) would rise by 1.6% of GDP, while 
the age cohorts of 65 years old or more would account for some 1.7% of GDP of the rise in indirect taxes in the 
period considered. The CPB projections indicate, however, that the increase in the tax to GDP ratio would be 
partly offset by a fall in other government revenue (such as the disappearance of natural gas revenue). As higher tax 
revenue from pensions/retired people may simply crowd out taxes on other income or from younger generations, it 
is difficult to correctly assess the impact of population ageing on government revenue. 
All in all, the budget balance would worsen by some 6.4% of GDP between 2010 and 2050 under the CPB 
projections.  
3. Risk assessment 
A comparison with the alternative study by the CPB suggests that the AWG estimates of ageing-related expenditure 
pressures in the Netherlands come with significant upside risks. However, the CPB projections indicate that 
government revenue would rise in the coming decades, which would partly offset the expenditure increase in the 
2006-2050 period. 
While ageing may in principle have a beneficial impact on government revenue, e.g. through the taxation of second-
pillar pensions, the increase in government revenue projected by the CPB for the 2006-2050 period should in our 
view not be entirely attributed to ageing but is likely to result largely from tax elasticities that are higher than one. 
Against this background, the net budgetary impact of population ageing for the 2010-2050 period may still be 
higher than the 5.2% of GDP estimated by the AWG.  
A cautious alternative headline projection of the ageing cost could consist of: 
•  keeping the AWG's projections for pension expenditure (that seem to be more consistent with 
more recent projections for life expectancy) and unemployment and education spending; 
•  increasing the AWG projections for health and long-term care expenditure by taking into account 
a constant income elasticity of 1.1 for the 2010-2050 period (which would raise health care costs 
by some 0.2% of GDP by 205090) and a gradual shift to the formal sector in the provision of 
long-term care as assumed in an alternative scenario presented by the AWG (which would raise 
long-term care expenditure by some 0.8% of GDP by 2050). 
This would amount to an ageing cost of around 6.2% of GDP in the 2010-2050 period. 
 
89   'Indicatie van effecten Financieel kader 2008-2011', CPB Notitie, 7 February 2007. 
90   The impact of an increase of the income elasticity from 1.05 (assumed in the reference scenario) to 1.1 on average over the 
2010-2050 period can be roughly estimated on the basis of a comparison of the AWG 'pure ageing' and 'positive income 
elasticity of demand' scenarios that take into account income elasticities of 1 and 1.05 respectively. 
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Fiche on AWG projections for Austria  
 
 
1.General description  
The latest AWG projections for Austria are based on a demographic scenario which implies an almost constant 
overall population of 8.3 and 8.2 million between 2010 and 2050. However, the age structure will change 
dramatically with the dependency ratio increasing from 26.3% in 2010 to 52.4% in 2050. The population of 
working age will shrink by 16%, while the elderly population will increase by 67%. However, the assumed increase 
in labour force participation rates should limit the decline in the number of employed persons to 8.8%. Structural 
unemployment is expected to remain unchanged at 3.4%. As labour productivity is expected to increase only 
slightly, the growth rates of GDP per capita will fall and overall potential GDP growth is likely to slow down from 
2.2% to 1.3% per year. 
It is projected that the ratio of ageing-related expenditure to GDP will increase by 1.1 percentage points between 
2010 and 2050, considerably less than the average for the EU and the euro area. While spending on health care and 
long-term care is set to increase by 1.3 and 0.8 percentage points respectively, expenditure for pensions and 
education is actually expected to fall (by 0.6 and 0.5 percentage point respectively). Expenditure on unemployment 
benefits should remain constant. 
2. Comparison with alternative projections and risk assessment 
To our knowledge, there is no recent comprehensive study on the future development of ageing-related 
expenditure for Austria besides the AWG projections. However, as far as the underlying demographic assumptions are 
concerned, an updated population projection was published by Statistics Austria in 2006.91 It assumes a somewhat 
higher net migration for the initial years and especially a more pronounced increase in life expectancy.92 While the 
AWG calculations are based on an increase in life expectancy at birth by 4 (5.4) years for females (males) between 
2010 and 2050, Statistics Austria predicts an increase by 5.3 (6.6) years. According to a sensitivity test performed by 
the AWG, a further increase in life expectancy at birth by 1.3 years for men and 1.1 years for women in 2050 – 
which would largely match the assumptions of the Statistical Office – would imply an additional increase in ageing-
related expenditure of 0.5 percentage point in 2050 (0.4 percentage point pensions, 0.1 percentage point health care 
and 0.0 percentage point long-term care).  
For pension expenditure, Austria is the only euro area country for which the AWG projects a decline in relation to 
GDP. This is the result of a succession of pension reforms in the years 2000 to 2004 that raise the average effective 
retirement age and substantially reduce the generosity of the state pension system. A good part of the difference 
from the 2001 AWG projections for pension expenditure (4.8 percentage points in 2050) can be attributed to these 
reforms. However, it is unclear whether the price indexation adopted for the adjustment of existing pensions will be 
socially and politically sustainable. In connection with increasing longevity and depending on real wage growth, it 
will lead to a substantial decline in benefit ratios between the start and the end of the retirement period.93 In 
addition, restrictions on early retirement have been eased again as of mid-2007. Moreover, the assumed increase in 
the participation rate could prove to be somewhat optimistic. Quantifying these three risks, the IMF arrives at an 
increase in pension expenditure to almost 15% of GDP in 2050, about 2 ½ percentage points higher than the 
AWG baseline figure.94 Finally, the AWG projections do not include expenditure for means-tested benefits 
supplementing very low pensions (currently approximately 0.4% of GDP) which could increase in the future not 
only because of the ageing population but also because of the lower benefit level.95  
                                                 
91   See Statistik Austria (2006), Bevölkerungsvorausschätzung 2006 – 2050, Wien (available at www.statistik.at).  
92   Overall, the old-age dependency ratio is nevertheless somewhat lower in the projections by Statistics Austria. With similar 
assumptions on fertility, the factors driving this result are, however, difficult to disentangle. 
93   See M. Knell, W. Köhler-Töglhofer, D. Prammer (2006), The Austrian Pension System – How recent reforms have 
changed fiscal sustainability and pension benefits, Monetary Policy and the Economy Q2/06. 
94   See E. Lundback, D. Kanda, A. Tieman (2007), Austria: Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. 07/143 (available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07143.pdf). 
95   See M. Knell, W. Köhler-Töglhofer, D. Prammer (2006), “The Austrian Pension System – How recent reforms have 
changed fiscal sustainability and pension benefits”, Monetary Policy and the Economy Q2/06.   66
                                                
Concerning health expenditure, (and also long-term care expenditure) alternative projections are provided by a recent 
OECD study.96 Under a comparable scenario assuming healthy ageing, a unit income elasticity, and no cost effect, 
the AWG (constant health scenario) and the OECD (demographic effect scenario) project an increase in the health 
spending ratio of, respectively, 1.0 and 0.6 percentage points over the 2005-2050 period.97 None of the scenarios 
provided in the OECD study is, however, fully comparable to the AWG reference scenario. With respect to age-
related expenditure profiles, the latter is based on an intermediate evolution between the pure ageing and the 
constant health scenario, that is, the initial age profile shifts by half the change in age-specific life expectancy. 
Moreover, in the AWG reference scenario, an income elasticity of demand of 1.1 in the base year is assumed that 
converges to 1 in 2050. The cost-containment scenario in the OECD study is instead based on the presumption of 
healthy ageing. While the income elasticity is 1, a residual growth of one percent in the base year converging to zero 
in 2050 is postulated. Under these assumptions, the increase in health expenditure is somewhat larger in the OECD 
study than in the AWG projections (1.9 percentage points compared to 1.5 percentage points between 2005 and 
2050). If income elasticity were to remain at 1.1 over the whole projection period, the increase in health expenditure 
would rise to 1.8 percentage points in the AWG projections as well (1.6 percentage points in the 2010-2050 
period).98  
In the OECD projections (demographic effects scenario), long-term care spending increases by 0.8 percentage point 
over 2005-2050, almost identical to the 0.9 percentage point increase in the AWG reference scenario. The OECD 
scenario assumes healthy ageing, zero income elasticity and a partial Baumol effect (i.e. that long-term costs per 
dependent increase by half of average labour productivity). In the same scenario, an increase in older workers’ 
participation rate to 70% (not too far away from the AWG assumptions) results in a rise in the long-term care 
spending ratio of as much as 4.1 percentage points. This is driven by the presumption that an increase in labour 
force participation will reduce the availability of informal care.99 An AWG scenario with an increase in formal care 
is not available for Austria. Approximating the impact of increased formal care by adding the difference between 
the AWG increase in formal care and pure ageing scenarios to the AWG reference scenario for the average of euro 
area countries for which data are available would, however, result in an increase in long-term care expenditure by 
1.3 percentage points in the 2010-2050 period. 
3. Conclusions 
As in other countries, the future evolution of age-related public expenditure in Austria is highly uncertain. The IMF 
quantifies the spread between the lower and upper bound for pension expenditure projections alone at 8% of GDP 
in 2050. A cautious alternative headline projection could take into account the higher life expectancy assumed in the 
latest population projection by Statistics Austria, the health care projection in the AWG reference scenario adjusted 
for an income elasticity of 1.1 and the additional rise in long-term care expenditure implied in the AWG’s increase 
in formal care scenario for the euro area average. This would work out roughly at an increase in ageing-related costs 
in relation to GDP of 2.4 percentage points between 2010 and 2050. 
 
96  See J. Oliveira Martins, C. de la Maisonneuve, and S. Bjornerud, “Projections of OECD health and long-term care public 
expenditures”, in Banca d’Italia (ed.), Fiscal Indicators, 2006.  
97   Demographic assumptions and the health expenditure taken into account are also not fully comparable. For instance, in 
2005 the health expenditure amounts to 5.3% of GDP in the AWG projections, while it is limited to 3.8% in the OECD 
study. With a similar relative increase, this might explain the obtained differences in the rise of the health expenditure ratio 
until 2050 in absolute terms. In the OECD study, no figures for 2010 are provided. 
98   This increase is approximated by adding the difference between the increase in the AWG’s ‘positive income elasticity of 
demand’ and ‘pure ageing’ scenarios to the AWG’s reference scenario. 
99   In the AWG reference scenario, the probability of receiving formal care is held constant at the 2004 level despite a 
substantial increase in the labour force participation of older workers.    67
 




The 2006 AWG projections for Portugal are based on a demographic scenario which implies a 4 per cent decrease 
in the overall population between 2004 and 2050. However, the demographic structure of the population is 
expected to change dramatically. In particular, an increase in the old-age dependency ratio101 from 25.4 per cent in 
2004 to 58.2 per cent in 2050 is forecast, reaching one of the highest levels among European Union countries. 
Working age population would decline by 1.6 million over the same period, corresponding to a change of around -
22%. This effect would be partially offset by the assumed rise in participation rates, in particular among females in 
the older age cohort (55 to 64 years old), and a decline in unemployment, limiting the fall in employment to 
approximately 0.7 million. Hence, average annual GDP growth would still be above the labour productivity growth 
rate in the 2004-2010 period, at around 1.9%, but below that figure afterwards, reaching 2.1 and 0.8% in the 2011-
2030 and 2031-2050 periods, respectively. It is worth noting that these projected potential GDP growth rates would 
remain below the European Union average over the whole period. 
Against this background, ageing-related expenditure was expected to increase by 9.7 percentage points (p.p.) of 
GDP between 2004 and 2050.102 The bulk of the increase would stem from pension outlays (+9.7 p.p. of GDP), 
since the small rise in health care expenditure (+0.5 p.p. of GDP) should be compensated by the declines in both 
unemployment benefits and education spending (-0.1 and -0.4 p.p. of GDP, respectively). 
At the beginning of 2007, a reform of the general social security system was approved. The main changes 
introduced by this reform were the following: 
•  New rule for the annual update of pensions depending on inflation, real GDP growth and the 
amount of the pension; 
•  Increase in the financial penalty for early retirement from 4.5 to 6% per each year relative to the 
statutory age of retirement (only possible for contributors with at least 30 years of contributory 
career and 55 years old); 
•  Introduction, from 2008 onwards, of a ‘sustainability factor’ which will reduce new pensions in 
accordance with the increase in life expectancy at the age of 65 years; 
•  The transition to a new formula for the calculation of the initial pension based on earnings from 
all the years of contributory career, introduced in 2002, will be faster.  
This package justified an update of the former projections of pension expenditure, which was peer-reviewed in the 
AWG and approved by the EPC in October 2007. Accordingly, in the context of the 2006 AWG exercise, pension 
expenditure in Portugal in now forecast to increase by 5.5 p.p. of GDP from 2004 to 2050. The figures for other 
ageing-related expenditure were kept unchanged.  
2. Comparison with alternative projections 
In order to assess the risks of the AWG projections, a comparison with pension expenditure projections published 
in May 2007 in a Banco de Portugal occasional paper may be useful.103 The approach followed by the authors is 
similar to the one used in the AWG projections: a predominantly accounting model was built and, on the basis of 
                                                 
100  Co-authored by Cláudia Rodrigues Braz.  
101  Defined as the ratio between the population of 65 years old or more and the working age population (from 15 to 64 years 
old). 
102  This figure does not include an estimate of the change in long-term care costs in the case of Portugal. The Commission 
services used a figure implying an increase in long-term care expenditure from 2004 to 2050 of 0.4 p.p. of GDP in the 
calculation of sustainability indicators. 
103  For more details, see Pinheiro, M. and Cunha, V. (2007), ‘MISS: A model for assessing the sustainability of public social 
security in Portugal’, Banco de Portugal Occasional Working Paper no. 2.   68
                                                
demographic, labour market and macroeconomic assumptions, the financial evolution of the public pension 
systems in Portugal was projected for the 2005-2080 period. 
Regarding the demographic scenario, contrary to the results of the AWG projections, the authors foresee an 
increase in overall population of approximately 16% between 2004 and 2050. This outcome stems both from a 
smaller reduction in working age population and a higher increase in the over-65 cohort, and is mainly related to 
the assumptions on migration flows. Indeed, while the AWG considers a significant reduction in the migration 
flows to around one-third of the current figures, the authors of the paper assume their stabilisation at a level close 
to the average of recent years.   
As far as labour market assumptions are concerned, there is an important difference in the projections for the 
participation rates. Albeit with a more marked decline in working age population, AWG projections assume a larger 
increase in participation rates.104 As a result, the growth rates for employment are quite similar. However, the time 
profiles of projected GDP growth rates are different due to the assumptions on productivity. While the AWG 
projections consider a gradual rise in productivity growth, from 1.5% in 2010 to 2.5% in 2050, the authors assumed 
a constant 2.0% growth from 2010 onwards. 
The differences in the above-mentioned assumptions, as well as those concerning the specifications and 
the inputs of the models, do not entail a sizeable divergence in the outcome. Indeed, according to the 
Pinheiro and Cunha (2007) paper, prior to the social security reform, pension expenditure was forecast to 
rise by 9.5 p.p. of GDP between 2005 and 2050, a figure quite similar to the 9.3% resulting from the 2006 
AWG projections. In addition, the authors also tested a proxy to the AWG assumptions in their model, 
and obtained an 8.5 p.p.-of-GDP rise in pension expenditure in the same horizon, which illustrates a 
possible magnitude for the impact of the different specification of the models.  
According to Pinheiro and Cunha (2007) calculations, on the basis of the AWG assumptions, the reform 
of the general security system would limit the increase in pension expenditure in the 2005-2050 period to 
a figure between 1.0 and 4.4 p.p. of GDP. The upper bound is comparable with the result of the revised 
AWG projection, which, as already mentioned, forecasts a rise in public pension expenditure of 5.5 p.p. 
of GDP from 2004 to 2050.105 
As regards health expenditure, the AWG reference scenario projects an increase of 0.5 p.p. of GDP between 2005 
and 2050 in Portugal. This scenario assumes an income elasticity of demand equal to 1.1 in the base year, 
converging to 1 by 2050. However, team members generally felt that an income elasticity of demand on average 
around 1.05 in the 2005-2050 period was on the low side, either because the convergence to 1 by 2050 may not be 
realistic or because econometric estimates for the past, on which this assumption may be based, may be biased by 
consolidation measures.106 In order to approximate a constant elasticity of 1.1, the difference between the AWG's 
'positive income elasticity of demand' scenario (average elasticity of 1.05) and the 'pure ageing' scenario (elasticity of 
1) can be added to the reference scenario results (average elasticity of 1.05), which in the case of Portugal amounts 
to +0.3 p.p. of GDP. Even after this adjustment, it is still worth highlighting the difference between the AWG 
projections and the results presented by Martins et al. (2006).107 According to these authors, health expenditure in 
Portugal in the 2005-2050 period is expected to rise by 2.4 or 4.2 p.p. of GDP in the two scenarios presented. Most 
of this difference apparently stems from the fact that they consider, beyond the demographic and income effects, a 
residual expenditure that, in the first scenario, is equal to 1% in 2005 and converges to zero by 2050 and, in the 
 
104  The ageing of the working age population should, ceteris paribus, lead to a decline in participation rates as these tend to be 
higher in the so-called ‘prime ages’, that is, between 25 and 50 years old. 
105  The range of results depends on the reaction of individuals to the introduction of the ‘sustainability factor’: they may opt for the 
postponement of retirement in order to avoid the financial penalty or they may choose to retire at the statutory age and have their 
pension reduced. The second option, retained in the revised AWG projection for Portugal, is less favourable in terms of the 
system’s sustainability. 
106  In the case of Portugal, the AWG presents an elasticity of public health care spending per capita with respect to GDP per capita 
equal to 4.72, 2.29 and 3.49 in the periods 1992-2002, 1982-2002 and 1972-2002, respectively. Following the recent policy 
measures implemented in the public health sector, this elasticity is expected to decline significantly.  
107  Martins et al. (2006), ‘Projections of OECD health and long-term care public expenditures’, OECD Economic Department 
Working Papers no. 477.   69
                                                
second scenario, grows at 1% per year in the projection period.108 In the case of Portugal, these two scenarios may 
prove to be optimistic or require the reinforcement of cost-containment policies in the future as the past behaviour 
of health expenditure in Portugal shows one of the highest residuals among OECD countries. 
For unemployment benefits and education spending projections, there is no recent alternative study worth 
comparing AWG projections with. However, it should be highlighted that the substantial room for improvement in 
the efficiency of public education and the increase in participation rates by age cohort will also affect the evolution 
of education expenditure in the coming years. The net impact of these factors may imply a bigger reduction in 
spending on education than that assumed in the AWG projections. 
Overall, beyond the non-quantifiable risks, AWG projections for ageing-related expenditure, without long-term 
care costs, could be adjusted, leading to an expected increase of between 1.3 and 4.7 p.p. of GDP between 2005 
and 2050 disaggregated as follows: between 1.0 and 4.4 p.p. of GDP in pension outlays, 0.8 p.p. of GDP in health 
care expenditure; -0.1 p.p. of GDP in unemployment benefits and -0.4 p.p. of GDP in education spending. 
3. Conclusions 
The choice of assumptions and specifications of the models required for drawing up long-term projections for 
ageing-related expenditure necessarily involve some degree of arbitrariness. As such, the range of plausible 
outcomes may be quite wide and they have to be assessed carefully. Bearing these caveats in mind, it is clear anyway 
that the paper by Pinheiro and Cunha (2007) basically confirms the main messages resulting from the initial and 
revised AWG projections. In fact, prior to the reform of the general social security system, it was clear that Portugal 
would have a high risk of unsustainability of public finances as a consequence of ageing-related expenditure 
developments, in particular pension expenditure. Additionally, the authors of the paper show that consistent 
implementation of the 2007 social security reform will have a sizeable impact on the sustainability of public 
finances. The magnitude of this impact is, however, conditional on individual workers’ reaction to the introduction 
of the ‘sustainability factor’. For other ageing-related expenditure items, the AWG projections involve a clear 
upward risk regarding health expenditure and a possible downward risk in education spending. 
 
108  It should also be noted that although Martins et al. (2006) use more favourable assumptions for the demographic and 
income effects – longevity gains are fully translated into equivalent additional years in good health and income elasticity is 
equal to one in every year of the projection period – the rise in health expenditure due to these factors (1.0 p.p. of GDP) is 
higher than that obtained by the AWG reference or ‘adjusted’ scenarios (0.5 and 0.8 p.p. of GDP, respectively).   70
 




The latest AWG projections for Finland are based on a demographic scenario with a constant overall 
population between 2010 and 2050 and a drastically changing age structure. The working age population 
is projected to decline by 13% and the old-age dependency ratio will almost double to 46.7% in 2050. 
With rising life expectancy, the labour market participation rate would increase, which, along with the 
projected decline in the unemployment rate, is projected to give rise to an increase in the employment rate 
of 55-64 year olds by nearly 15 percentage points to about 65% between 2004 and 2050 and to a rise in 
the overall employment rate by some 7 percentage points to 74% in 2050. Although this will partly soften 
the impact of the demographic changes on total employment, the latter would still drop by more than 
0.1% a year on average in the 2004-2050 period and real GDP growth is expected to fall significantly 
from 2.2% in 2010 to 1.4% in 2050. 
Against this background, the AWG projections point to an increase in total age-related expenditure of 
some 5.0% of GDP between 2010 and 2050. Pension expenditure would rise by 2.5% of GDP while 
outlays for health care and long-term care would increase by 1.2 and 1.6% of GDP respectively. Both 
education costs and unemployment spending would fall slightly in the 2010-2050 period (by 0.3 and 0.1% 
of GDP respectively). 
2. Comparison with alternative projections 
In order to assess the possible risks pertaining to the AWG results, the projected ageing-related 
expenditure increases as well as the underlying macroeconomic assumptions, can be compared with 
alternative national and international projections. Concerning health care and social care spending, a large 
number of national projections have been made by the Finnish authorities and research institutions. Most 
recently, for example, the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, the National Research and Development 
Centre for Welfare and Health (STAKES), the Government Institute for Economic Research (VATT), as 
well as the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA) and Prime Minister's Office (PMO), have 
published long-term projections for public spending. The Bank of Finland has also estimated the increase 
in the ageing-related spending items in the long term. The OECD and the Central Planning Bureau of the 
Netherlands (CPB) have also published some projections for the age-related expenditure in Finland. 
The estimated increase in health and long-term care expenditure varies significantly across studies, from 2 
to 4.2% of GDP for the period 2004/2005 to 2050. However, most of these estimates are not comparable 
with AWG projections because of differences in data sources, the definition of expenditure items and 
underlying assumptions. A particular problem is associated with expenditure on day care for children, 
which is high in Finland in comparison to other EU countries and can not be separated from other age-
related spending items. The PMO and Bank of Finland estimates are most comparable to the AWG 
projections and suggest an increase of 2.8 and 4.2% of GDP up to 2050 respectively. OECD and CPB 
projections for health and long-term care and pensions in Finland are close to AWG projections. 
Macroeconomic assumptions explain part of the difference between the highest and lowest projections 
for the increase in spending on health and long-term care. The highest estimated increase - by the Bank of 
Finland - is based on slower employment growth than the AWG projections. It should be stressed that 
the AWG's assumptions on the evolution of employment would imply an increase in the employment rate 
of prime age cohorts (of between 25 and 55 years old) to more than 90% by 2050, which would seem 
somewhat optimistic. However, the difference in the projected ageing costs is also due to the Baumol 
effect: in the Bank of Finland projections prices of public services continue to increase at a faster pace 
than the price of GDP, thereby increasing the share of public spending to GDP. 
                                                 
109   Co-authored by Helvi Kinnunen and Nadine Leiner-Killinger.   71
                                                
For long-term care in particular, the headline AWG estimates may also underestimate spending pressures 
by not taking sufficient account of a potential shift towards increased formal care provision. An 
alternative scenario presented by the AWG suggests that such a shift may raise long-term care spending 
by an additional 0.5% of GDP in the 2010-2050 period. 
For pension spending, long-term projections are produced by ETLA, using an OLG-model, and by the 
Finnish Centre for Pensions (ETK), using a micro simulation framework. The PMO ageing project also 
includes some estimates on the growth of pension expenditure. In addition, the OECD and CPB 
projections include estimates for Finland. The Bank of Finland has made calculations by using an 
intertemporal accounting framework as well as its own DSGE model. The estimates of all institutions 
except the PMO are fairly close to each other and are somewhat higher than those of the AWG. The 
PMO estimate of a 2.4 percentage point increase in pension expenditure by 2050 is clearly an outlier. This 
stems from a more optimistic view on productivity growth than in the other projections. Fast productivity 
growth will lower the average pension-wage ratio because past earnings have only a limited effect on 
pension entitlements. The highest estimate of a 3.9 percentage point increase by ETLA results from an 
assumption that there would be a change in the rule of indexation for non-wage-related national pension 
insurance benefits.   
3.Risk assessment 
The available information suggests that the most important specific upside risks pertain to the AWG 
estimates on the increase in expenditure on health and long-term care.  
All in all, a more cautious alternative headline estimate for ageing costs may be constructed by: 
•  keeping the AWG macroeconomic projections and expenditure estimates for pensions and 
unemployment and education expenditure; 
•  taking into account a shift to more long-term care provision as in the aforementioned AWG 
alternative scenario; 
•  and keeping the income elasticity used in the health care projections constant at 1.1 (rather than 
the gradual decline to 1 incorporated in the AWG reference scenario)110. 















110  The impact of an increase in the income elasticity from 1.05 (assumed in the reference scenario) to 1.1 on average over the 2010-2050 
period can be roughly estimated on the basis of a comparison of the AWG 'pure ageing' and 'positive income elasticity of demand' 
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